ACM Transactions on Computer Systems (TOCS)
Secrecy by typing in security protocols
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
ACM Transactions on Programming Languages and Systems (TOPLAS)
A Semantic Model for Authentication Protocols
SP '93 Proceedings of the 1993 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
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CSF '08 Proceedings of the 2008 21st IEEE Computer Security Foundations Symposium
Specifying Secure Transport Channels
CSF '08 Proceedings of the 2008 21st IEEE Computer Security Foundations Symposium
Proceedings of the 6th ACM workshop on Formal methods in security engineering
Information and Computation
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Mathematical Structures in Computer Science
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ICALP'06 Proceedings of the 33rd international conference on Automata, Languages and Programming - Volume Part II
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FAST'09 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Formal Aspects in Security and Trust
Design, implementation, and deployment of the iKP secure electronic payment system
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
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We introduce a calculus with mobile names, distributed principals and primitives for secure remote communication, without any reference to explicit cryptography. The calculus is equipped with a system of types and effects providing static guarantees of secrecy and authenticity in the presence of a Dolev-Yao intruder. The novelty with respect to existing type systems for security is in the structure of our secrecy and authenticity types, which are inspired by the formulas of BAN Logic, and retain much of the simplicity and intuitive reading of such formulas. Drawing on these types, the type system makes it possible to characterize authenticity directly as a property of the data exchanged during a protocol rather than indirectly by extracting and interpreting the effects the protocol has on that data.