A calculus of mobile processes, I
Information and Computation
On reduction-based process semantics
Selected papers of the thirteenth conference on Foundations of software technology and theoretical computer science
A calculus for cryptographic protocols
Information and Computation
Authentication primitives and their compilation
Proceedings of the 27th ACM SIGPLAN-SIGACT symposium on Principles of programming languages
Mobile values, new names, and secure communication
POPL '01 Proceedings of the 28th ACM SIGPLAN-SIGACT symposium on Principles of programming languages
Secure implementation of channel abstractions
Information and Computation
On Asynchrony in Name-Passing Calculi
ICALP '98 Proceedings of the 25th International Colloquium on Automata, Languages and Programming
Protection in Programming-Language Translations
ICALP '98 Proceedings of the 25th International Colloquium on Automata, Languages and Programming
On asynchrony in name-passing calculi
Mathematical Structures in Computer Science
Theoretical Computer Science - Special issue: Foundations of wide area network computing
Secrecy types for a simulatable cryptographic library
Proceedings of the 12th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Secure Implementations for Typed Session Abstractions
CSF '07 Proceedings of the 20th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Symposium
Cryptographically sound implementations for typed information-flow security
Proceedings of the 35th annual ACM SIGPLAN-SIGACT symposium on Principles of programming languages
Language Based Secure Communication
CSF '08 Proceedings of the 2008 21st IEEE Computer Security Foundations Symposium
Secrecy and authenticity types for secure distributed messaging
ARSPA-WITS'10 Proceedings of the 2010 joint conference on Automated reasoning for security protocol analysis and issues in the theory of security
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Process algebraic techniques for distributed systems are increasingly being targeted at identifying abstractions that are adequate for both high-level programming and specification and security analysis and verification. Drawing on our earlier work in Bugliesi and Focardi, (2008), we investigate the expressive power of a core set of security and network abstractions that provide high-level primitives for specifying the honest principals in a network, while at the same time enabling an analysis of the network-level adversarial attacks that may be mounted by an intruder. We analyse various bisimulation equivalences for security that arise from endowing the intruder with: (i)different adversarial capabilities; and(ii)increasingly powerful control over the interaction among the distributed principals of a network. By comparing the relative strength of the bisimulation equivalences, we obtain a direct measure of the intruder's discriminating power, and hence of the expressiveness of the corresponding intruder model.