Secrecy and authenticity types for secure distributed messaging
ARSPA-WITS'10 Proceedings of the 2010 joint conference on Automated reasoning for security protocol analysis and issues in the theory of security
Understanding abstractions of secure channels
FAST'10 Proceedings of the 7th International conference on Formal aspects of security and trust
Analysing protocol stacks for services
Rigorous software engineering for service-oriented systems
Specifying and modelling secure channels in strand spaces
FAST'09 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Formal Aspects in Security and Trust
Analysing applications layered on unilaterally authenticating protocols
FAST'11 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Formal Aspects of Security and Trust
Sessions and separability in security protocols
POST'13 Proceedings of the Second international conference on Principles of Security and Trust
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Security architectures often make use of secure transport protocols to protect network messages: the transport protocols provide secure channels between hosts. In this paper we present a hierarchy of specifications for secure channels. We give trace specifications capturing a number of different confidentiality and authentication properties that secure channels might satisfy, and compare their strengths. We use the various modes of TLS as a running example, and we give examples of single-message protocols that we believe satisfy the channel specifications.