Analysing applications layered on unilaterally authenticating protocols

Authors:
Thomas Gibson-Robinson;Gavin Lowe
Affiliations:
Department of Computer Science, University of Oxford, Oxford, UK;Department of Computer Science, University of Oxford, Oxford, UK
Venue:
FAST'11 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Formal Aspects of Security and Trust
Year:
2011

Citing 11
Cited 0

Strand spaces: proving security protocols correct

Journal of Computer Security
Authentication tests and the structure of bundles

Theoretical Computer Science
LTL Model Checking for Security Protocols

CSF '07 Proceedings of the 20th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Symposium
Language Based Secure Communication

CSF '08 Proceedings of the 2008 21st IEEE Computer Security Foundations Symposium
Specifying Secure Transport Channels

CSF '08 Proceedings of the 2008 21st IEEE Computer Security Foundations Symposium
Formal analysis of SAML 2.0 web browser single sign-on: breaking the SAML-based single sign-on for google apps

Proceedings of the 6th ACM workshop on Formal methods in security engineering
Searching for shapes in cryptographic protocols

TACAS'07 Proceedings of the 13th international conference on Tools and algorithms for the construction and analysis of systems
Secure pseudonymous channels

ESORICS'09 Proceedings of the 14th European conference on Research in computer security
Understanding abstractions of secure channels

FAST'10 Proceedings of the 7th International conference on Formal aspects of security and trust
Vertical Protocol Composition

CSF '11 Proceedings of the 2011 IEEE 24th Computer Security Foundations Symposium
Specifying and modelling secure channels in strand spaces

FAST'09 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Formal Aspects in Security and Trust

Quantified Score

Hi-index	0.00

Visualization

Abstract

There are many approaches to proving the correctness of application-layer protocols that are layered on secure transport protocols, such as TLS. One popular approach is verification by abstraction, in which the correctness of the application-layer protocol is proven under the assumption that the transport layer satisfies certain properties. Following this approach, we adapt the strand spaces model in order to analyse application-layer protocols that depend on unilaterally authenticating secure transport protocols, such as unilateral TLS. We develop proof rules that enable us to prove the correctness of application-layer protocols that use either unilateral or bilateral secure transport protocols, and illustrate them by proving the correctness of WebAuth, a single-sign-on protocol that makes extensive use of unilateral TLS.