Entity authentication and key distribution
CRYPTO '93 Proceedings of the 13th annual international cryptology conference on Advances in cryptology
Strand spaces: proving security protocols correct
Journal of Computer Security
Using encryption for authentication in large networks of computers
Communications of the ACM
Constraint solving for bounded-process cryptographic protocol analysis
CCS '01 Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Computer and Communications Security
Authentication tests and the structure of bundles
Theoretical Computer Science
Language Primitives and Type Discipline for Structured Communication-Based Programming
ESOP '98 Proceedings of the 7th European Symposium on Programming: Programming Languages and Systems
Breaking and Fixing the Needham-Schroeder Public-Key Protocol Using FDR
TACAs '96 Proceedings of the Second International Workshop on Tools and Algorithms for Construction and Analysis of Systems
Analysis of Key-Exchange Protocols and Their Use for Building Secure Channels
EUROCRYPT '01 Proceedings of the International Conference on the Theory and Application of Cryptographic Techniques: Advances in Cryptology
Protocol Independence through Disjoint Encryption
CSFW '00 Proceedings of the 13th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Protocol Insecurity with Finite Number of Sessions is NP-Complete
CSFW '01 Proceedings of the 14th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Universally Composable Security: A New Paradigm for Cryptographic Protocols
FOCS '01 Proceedings of the 42nd IEEE symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
A derivation system and compositional logic for security protocols
Journal of Computer Security
Multiparty asynchronous session types
Proceedings of the 35th annual ACM SIGPLAN-SIGACT symposium on Principles of programming languages
Specifying Secure Transport Channels
CSF '08 Proceedings of the 2008 21st IEEE Computer Security Foundations Symposium
Composition of Password-Based Protocols
CSF '08 Proceedings of the 2008 21st IEEE Computer Security Foundations Symposium
From One Session to Many: Dynamic Tags for Security Protocols
LPAR '08 Proceedings of the 15th International Conference on Logic for Programming, Artificial Intelligence, and Reasoning
Safely composing security protocols
Formal Methods in System Design
Cryptographic Protocol Synthesis and Verification for Multiparty Sessions
CSF '09 Proceedings of the 2009 22nd IEEE Computer Security Foundations Symposium
ESORICS'09 Proceedings of the 14th European conference on Research in computer security
Protocol Composition for Arbitrary Primitives
CSF '10 Proceedings of the 2010 23rd IEEE Computer Security Foundations Symposium
Dynamic multirole session types
Proceedings of the 38th annual ACM SIGPLAN-SIGACT symposium on Principles of programming languages
Composition theorems without pre-established session identifiers
Proceedings of the 18th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
CSF '11 Proceedings of the 2011 IEEE 24th Computer Security Foundations Symposium
The AVISPA tool for the automated validation of internet security protocols and applications
CAV'05 Proceedings of the 17th international conference on Computer Aided Verification
Security goals and protocol transformations
TOSCA'11 Proceedings of the 2011 international conference on Theory of Security and Applications
On the security of public key protocols
IEEE Transactions on Information Theory
ESORICS'07 Proceedings of the 12th European conference on Research in Computer Security
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Despite much work on sessions and session types in non-adversarial contexts, session-like behavior given an active adversary has not received an adequate definition and proof methods. We provide a syntactic property that guarantees that a protocol has session-respecting executions. Any uncompromised subset of the participants are still guaranteed that their interaction will respect sessions. A protocol transformation turns any protocol into a session-respecting protocol. We do this via a general theory of separability. Our main theorem applies to different separability requirements, and characterizes when we can separate protocol executions sufficiently to meet a particular requirement. This theorem also gives direct proofs of some old and new protocol composition results. Thus, our theory of separability appears to cover protocol composition and session-like behavior within a uniform framework, and gives a general pattern for reasoning about independence.