Security goals and protocol transformations

  • Authors:
  • Joshua D. Guttman

  • Affiliations:
  • Worcester Polytechnic Institute

  • Venue:
  • TOSCA'11 Proceedings of the 2011 international conference on Theory of Security and Applications
  • Year:
  • 2011

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Abstract

Cryptographic protocol designers work incrementally. Having achieved some goals for confidentiality and authentication in a protocol Π1 , they transform it to a richer Π2 to achieve new goals. But do the original goals still hold? More precisely, if a goal formula Γ holds whenever Π1 runs against an adversary, does a translation of Γ hold whenever Π2 runs against it? We prove that a transformation preserves goal formulas if a labeled transition system for analyzing Π1 simulates a portion of an lts for analyzing Π2 , while preserving progress in that portion. Thus, we examine the process of analyzing a protocol Π. We use ltss that describe our activity when analyzing Π, not that of the principals executing Π. Each analysis step considers--for an observed message reception--what earlier transmissions would explain it. The lts then contains a transition from a fragmentary execution containing the reception to a richer one containing an explaining transmission. The strand space protocol analysis tool cpsa generates some of the ltss used.