Security analysis of network protocols: logical and computational methods
PPDP '05 Proceedings of the 7th ACM SIGPLAN international conference on Principles and practice of declarative programming
A modular correctness proof of IEEE 802.11i and TLS
Proceedings of the 12th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
A derivation system and compositional logic for security protocols
Journal of Computer Security
On the impossibility of building secure cliques-type authenticated group key agreement protocols
Journal of Computer Security - Special issue on CSFW17
Compositional analysis of contract-signing protocols
Theoretical Computer Science - Automated reasoning for security protocol analysis
Protocol Composition Logic (PCL)
Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science (ENTCS)
Just fast keying in the pi calculus
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
On the protocol composition logic PCL
Proceedings of the 2008 ACM symposium on Information, computer and communications security
An Automated Approach for Proving PCL Invariants
Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science (ENTCS)
Analysis of EAP-GPSK authentication protocol
ACNS'08 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Applied cryptography and network security
Security goals and protocol transformations
TOSCA'11 Proceedings of the 2011 international conference on Theory of Security and Applications
Provably repairing the ISO/IEC 9798 standard for entity authentication
POST'12 Proceedings of the First international conference on Principles of Security and Trust
Sound security protocol transformations
POST'13 Proceedings of the Second international conference on Principles of Security and Trust
Provably repairing the ISO/IEC 9798 standard for entity authentication
Journal of Computer Security - Security and Trust Principles
Establishing and preserving protocol security goals
Journal of Computer Security - Foundational Aspects of Security
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Protocols may be derived from initial components bycomposition, refinement, and transformation. Addingfunction variables to a previous protocol logic, we developan abstraction-instantiation method for reasoning abouta class of protocol refinements. The main idea is to viewchanges in a protocol as a combination of finding a meaningful "protocol template" that contains function variables in messages, and producing the refined protocol asan instance of the template. Using higher-order protocol logic, we can develop a single proof for all instances of a template. A template can also be instantiated to another template, or a single protocol may be an instance of more than one template, allowing separate protocol properties to be proved modularly. These methods are illustrated using some challenge-response and key exchangeprotocol templates and an exploration of the design spacesurrounding JFK (Just Fast Keying) and related protocols from the IKE (Internet Key Exchange) family, which produces some interesting protocols not previously studied in the open literature.