Just fast keying in the pi calculus

  • Authors:
  • Martín Abadi;Bruno Blanchet;Cédric Fournet

  • Affiliations:
  • University of California, Santa Cruz, CA and Microsoft Research, Mountain View, CA;CNRS, école Normale Supérieure, Paris;Microsoft Research, Cambridge, United Kingdom

  • Venue:
  • ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
  • Year:
  • 2007

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Abstract

JFK is a recent, attractive protocol for fast key establishment as part of securing IP communication. In this paper, we formally analyze this protocol in the applied pi calculus (partly in terms of observational equivalences and partly with the assistance of an automatic protocol verifier). We treat JFK's core security properties and also other properties that are rarely articulated and rigorously studied, such as plausible deniability and resistance to denial-of-service attacks. In the course of this analysis, we found some ambiguities and minor problems, such as limitations in identity protection, but we mostly obtain positive results about JFK. For this purpose, we develop ideas and techniques that should be more generally useful in the specification and verification of security protocols.