A cost-based framework for analysis of denial of service in networks

  • Authors:
  • Catherine Meadows

  • Affiliations:
  • -

  • Venue:
  • Journal of Computer Security
  • Year:
  • 2001

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Abstract

Denial of service is becoming a growing concern. As computersystems communicate more and more with others that they know lessand less, they become increasingly vulnerable to hostile intruderswho may take advantage of the very protocols intended for theestablishment and authentication of communication to tie upresources and disable servers. This paper shows how some principlesthat have already been used to make cryptographic protocols moreresistant to denial of service by trading off the cost to defenderagainst the cost to the attacker can be formalized based on amodification of the Gong-Syverson fail-stop model of cryptographicprotocols, and indicates the ways in which existing cryptographicprotocol analysis tools could be modified to operate within thisformal framework. We also indicate how this framework could beextended to protocols that do not make use of strongauthentication.