IFIP TC6/ 6.1 international conference on formal description techniques IX/protocol specification, testing and verification XVI on Formal description techniques IX : theory, application and tools: theory, application and tools
A cost-based framework for analysis of denial of service in networks
Journal of Computer Security
Duration Calculus Specification of Schedulimg for Tasks with Shared Resources
ACSC '95 Proceedings of the 1995 Asian Computing Science Conference on Algorithms, Concurrency and Knowledge
A Hardware Semantics Based on Temporal Intervals
Proceedings of the 10th Colloquium on Automata, Languages and Programming
Duration Specifications for Shared Processors
Proceedings of the Second International Symposium on Formal Techniques in Real-Time and Fault-Tolerant Systems
A Formal Proof of the Deadline Driven Scheduler
ProCoS Proceedings of the Third International Symposium Organized Jointly with the Working Group Provably Correct Systems on Formal Techniques in Real-Time and Fault-Tolerant Systems
Proving Properties of Security Protocols by Induction
CSFW '97 Proceedings of the 10th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
A Note on the Denial-of-Service Problem
SP '83 Proceedings of the 1983 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
An approach to analyzing availability properties of security protocols
Nordic Journal of Computing
An approach to analyzing availability properties of security protocols
Nordic Journal of Computing
A logical specification for usage control
Proceedings of the ninth ACM symposium on Access control models and technologies
Formal model and policy specification of usage control
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
Timed verification of the reliable adaptive multicast protocol
Journal of Systems and Software
A survey on temporal logics for specifying and verifying real-time systems
Frontiers of Computer Science: Selected Publications from Chinese Universities
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This paper presents an approach to the analysis of real-time properties of security protocols, based on the use of Interval Logic with durations to express and reason about temporal phenomena. We focus on the analysis of availability, where time is known to play a significant role, illustrate how relevant timing requirements can be formulated and show how Interval Logic can be used to prove that a system can fulfil these requirements in the presence of attackers of a given strength. We link this logic-based approach to more operational approaches.