Authentication and authenticated key exchanges
Designs, Codes and Cryptography
IFIP TC6/ 6.1 international conference on formal description techniques IX/protocol specification, testing and verification XVI on Formal description techniques IX : theory, application and tools: theory, application and tools
Cryptography and network security (2nd ed.): principles and practice
Cryptography and network security (2nd ed.): principles and practice
The inductive approach to verifying cryptographic protocols
Journal of Computer Security
A cost-based framework for analysis of denial of service in networks
Journal of Computer Security
Specifying and Verifying Requirements of Real-Time Systems
IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering
A Hardware Semantics Based on Temporal Intervals
Proceedings of the 10th Colloquium on Automata, Languages and Programming
Duration Specifications for Shared Processors
Proceedings of the Second International Symposium on Formal Techniques in Real-Time and Fault-Tolerant Systems
A Formal Proof of the Deadline Driven Scheduler
ProCoS Proceedings of the Third International Symposium Organized Jointly with the Working Group Provably Correct Systems on Formal Techniques in Real-Time and Fault-Tolerant Systems
Using interval logics for temporal analysis of security protocols
Proceedings of the 2003 ACM workshop on Formal methods in security engineering
Isabelle/HOL: a proof assistant for higher-order logic
Isabelle/HOL: a proof assistant for higher-order logic
Using interval logics for temporal analysis of security protocols
Proceedings of the 2003 ACM workshop on Formal methods in security engineering
Timed traces and strand spaces
CSR'07 Proceedings of the Second international conference on Computer Science: theory and applications
| Hi-index | 0.00 |
Meadows has shown how availability issues involving security protocols may be treated by analyzing the time-consuming internal actions of agents with respect to failstop criteria that are cost dependent.In this paper we present a technique which combines Paulson's inductive approach to protocol analysis with Interval Logic in order to create a verification tool that supports analysis of the kind Meadows proposes.Based on a novel notion of packets and a redefined notion of external events we develop theoretical extensions that enable the inductive analysis method to distinguish active attacks . To supplement the global traces of external events we define an inductive theory of (untimed) local traces of internal actions. Notions of timed global traces and timed local traces are introduced and used to develop a method that allows natural modelling of real-time (cost) properties of security protocols.Proof support for the theory developed here is achieved via encoding in Isabelle/ LSILHOL, an Isabelle/HOL environment for (labelled) interval logics. Some small examples of protocols are treated and properties are shown via interactive theorem proving.