IFIP TC6/ 6.1 international conference on formal description techniques IX/protocol specification, testing and verification XVI on Formal description techniques IX : theory, application and tools: theory, application and tools
Strand spaces: proving security protocols correct
Journal of Computer Security
The inductive approach to verifying cryptographic protocols
Journal of Computer Security
Using encryption for authentication in large networks of computers
Communications of the ACM
A cost-based framework for analysis of denial of service in networks
Journal of Computer Security
Specifying and Verifying Requirements of Real-Time Systems
IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering
Automated Proof Support for Interval Logics
LPAR '01 Proceedings of the Artificial Intelligence on Logic for Programming
Duration Calculus Specification of Schedulimg for Tasks with Shared Resources
ACSC '95 Proceedings of the 1995 Asian Computing Science Conference on Algorithms, Concurrency and Knowledge
A Hardware Semantics Based on Temporal Intervals
Proceedings of the 10th Colloquium on Automata, Languages and Programming
An Adequate First Order Interval Logic
COMPOS'97 Revised Lectures from the International Symposium on Compositionality: The Significant Difference
Duration Specifications for Shared Processors
Proceedings of the Second International Symposium on Formal Techniques in Real-Time and Fault-Tolerant Systems
A Formal Proof of the Deadline Driven Scheduler
ProCoS Proceedings of the Third International Symposium Organized Jointly with the Working Group Provably Correct Systems on Formal Techniques in Real-Time and Fault-Tolerant Systems
Modelling and verifying key-exchange protocols using CSP and FDR
CSFW '95 Proceedings of the 8th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Some new attacks upon security protocols
CSFW '96 Proceedings of the 9th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Duration Calculus: A Formal Approach to Real-Time Systems (Monographs in Theoretical Computer Science. an Eatcs Seris)
An approach to analyzing availability properties of security protocols
Nordic Journal of Computing
A formal specification and verification method for the prevention of denial of service
SP'88 Proceedings of the 1988 IEEE conference on Security and privacy
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This paper presents an approach to the analysis of real-time properties of security protocols, based on the Strand Space formalism for describing the behaviour of the participants in the protocol. The approach is compared with a trace-based analysis introduced by Pilegaard et al. [14]. Interval Logic with durations is used to express and reason about temporal phenomena. Strand Spaces were chosen as the starting point for our approach, since the causalities between important events in protocols are revealed in an illustrative manner by this formalism. The advantage of the trace-based approach is that it supports inductive reasoning in connection with the analysis of untimed properties. Interval Logic is chosen as the real-time formalism, as timing requirements and timing properties of security protocols are often expressible as interval properties. As an example, the Kerberos authentication protocol, which is based on concepts like timestamps and lifetimes, and which requires freshness of certain messages, is analysed.