A cost-based framework for analysis of denial of service in networks
Journal of Computer Security
Just fast keying: Key agreement in a hostile internet
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
Modelling denial of service attacks on JFK with Meadows's cost-based framework
ACSW Frontiers '06 Proceedings of the 2006 Australasian workshops on Grid computing and e-research - Volume 54
Cost-based and time-based analysis of DoS-resistance in HIP
ACSC '07 Proceedings of the thirtieth Australasian conference on Computer science - Volume 62
A Proposal to Improve IKEv2 negotiation
SECUREWARE '07 Proceedings of the The International Conference on Emerging Security Information, Systems, and Technologies
Towards Denial-of-Service-Resilient Key Agreement Protocols
ACISP '09 Proceedings of the 14th Australasian Conference on Information Security and Privacy
Stronger difficulty notions for client puzzles and denial-of-service-resistant protocols
CT-RSA'11 Proceedings of the 11th international conference on Topics in cryptology: CT-RSA 2011
Formal modelling and automatic detection of resource exhaustion attacks
Proceedings of the 6th ACM Symposium on Information, Computer and Communications Security
Key exchange in IPsec revisited: formal analysis of IKEv1 and IKEv2
ESORICS'11 Proceedings of the 16th European conference on Research in computer security
Towards a provably secure dos-resilient key exchange protocol with perfect forward secrecy
INDOCRYPT'11 Proceedings of the 12th international conference on Cryptology in India
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With the growing concerns on the information security and the capabilities of an attacker, Denial of Service (DoS) attacks have become one of the most serious and potent form of network security attacks. The attackers target the protocols to exhaust resources by either disabling the servers or disrupting the protocol exchange. In fact, almost all the communication protocols including TCP, HIP, etc. are vulnerable to resource exhaustion attacks. One of the ways of dealing with the DoS attacks is to carry out a cost analysis of the impact of the DoS attacks and ensure that the impact of the same is minimized to the extent possible. We illustrate the applicability of the same to analyze the Internet Key Exchange (IKE) version2 protocol. IKEv2 is one of the significant protocol of IPSec suite. It establishes the security association between source and destination before IPSec connection establishes. In this paper, we analyze IKEv2 protocol to show that IKE v2 is susceptible to DoS attacks. To the best of our knowledge, although IKE v1 has been analyzed for susceptibility to the DoS attacks, IKE v2 has not yet been. We also propose a new variant of IKE v2 protocol using model given by Stebila and et al. to ensure mitigation of DoS attacks in IKEv2.