A cost-based framework for analysis of denial of service in networks
Journal of Computer Security
DOS-Resistant Authentication with Client Puzzles
Revised Papers from the 8th International Workshop on Security Protocols
Some new attacks upon security protocols
CSFW '96 Proceedings of the 9th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
A Hierarchy of Authentication Specifications
CSFW '97 Proceedings of the 10th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Efficient Authentication and Signing of Multicast Streams over Lossy Channels
SP '00 Proceedings of the 2000 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Just fast keying: Key agreement in a hostile internet
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
Efficient authenticated key agreement protocols resistant to a denial-of-service attack
International Journal of Network Management
Modelling denial of service attacks on JFK with Meadows's cost-based framework
ACSW Frontiers '06 Proceedings of the 2006 Australasian workshops on Grid computing and e-research - Volume 54
SAT-based model-checking for security protocols analysis
International Journal of Information Security
Towards Denial-of-Service-Resilient Key Agreement Protocols
ACISP '09 Proceedings of the 14th Australasian Conference on Information Security and Privacy
Security Notions and Generic Constructions for Client Puzzles
ASIACRYPT '09 Proceedings of the 15th International Conference on the Theory and Application of Cryptology and Information Security: Advances in Cryptology
RTA'06 Proceedings of the 17th international conference on Term Rewriting and Applications
Customizing protocol specifications for detecting resource exhaustion and guessing attacks
FMCO'10 Proceedings of the 9th international conference on Formal Methods for Components and Objects
Some improvements to the cost-based framework for analyzing denial of service attacks
INTRUST'11 Proceedings of the Third international conference on Trusted Systems
Modeling and analysis of internet key exchange protocolv2 and a proposal for its variant
Proceedings of the 6th ACM India Computing Convention
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Many common protocols: TCP, IPSec, etc., are vulnerable to denial of service attacks, where adversaries maliciously consume significant resources of honest principals, leading to resource exhaustion. We propose a set of cost-based rules that formalize DoS attacks by resource exhaustion and can automate their detection. Our classification separates excessive but legal protocol use (e.g., flooding) from illegal protocol manipulation that causes participants to waste computation time without reaching the protocol goals. We also distinguish simple intruder intervention leading to wasteful execution from DoS attacks proper, which can be repeatedly initiated. Our rules can highlight attacks that are undetectable by the targeted honest agents, or by all protocol participants. We have successfully tested an implementation of the methodology in a validation platform on relevant protocol examples, in what to the best of our knowledge is the first formal automated analysis of DoS attacks.