Just fast keying: Key agreement in a hostile internet

  • Authors:
  • William Aiello;Steven M. Bellovin;Matt Blaze;Ran Canetti;John Ioannidis;Angelos D. Keromytis;Omer Reingold

  • Affiliations:
  • AT&T Labs Research;AT&T Labs Research;AT&T Labs Research;IBM T. J. Watson Research Center;AT&T Labs Research;Columbia University, New York, NY;AT&T Labs Research

  • Venue:
  • ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
  • Year:
  • 2004

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Abstract

We describe Just Fast Keying (JFK), a new key-exchange protocol, primarily designed for use in the IP security architecture. It is simple, efficient, and secure; we sketch a proof of the latter property. JFK also has a number of novel engineering parameters that permit a variety of tradeoffs, most notably the ability to balance the need for perfect forward secrecy against susceptibility to denial-of-service attacks.