Communicating sequential processes
Communicating sequential processes
Design and validation of computer protocols
Design and validation of computer protocols
Conditional rewriting logic as a unified model of concurrency
Selected papers of the Second Workshop on Concurrency and compositionality
An attack on the Needham-Schroeder public-key authentication protocol
Information Processing Letters
A calculus for cryptographic protocols
Information and Computation
Inductive analysis of the Internet protocol TLS
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
Specification and proof in membership equational logic
Theoretical Computer Science - Trees in algebra and programming
Verisim: Formal analysis of network simulations
Proceedings of the 2000 ACM SIGSOFT international symposium on Software testing and analysis
The inductive approach to verifying cryptographic protocols
Journal of Computer Security
Verisim: Formal Analysis of Network Simulations
IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering
Handbook of Applied Cryptography
Handbook of Applied Cryptography
Formal verification of standards for distance vector routing protocols
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
Maude: specification and programming in rewriting logic
Theoretical Computer Science - Rewriting logic and its applications
From Secrecy to Authenticity in Security Protocols
SAS '02 Proceedings of the 9th International Symposium on Static Analysis
Just fast keying: Key agreement in a hostile internet
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
The modelling and analysis of security protocols: the csp approach
The modelling and analysis of security protocols: the csp approach
IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials
Specification and analysis of the AER/NCA active network protocol suite in Real-Time Maude
Formal Methods in System Design
Securing the drop-box architecture for assisted living
Proceedings of the fourth ACM workshop on Formal methods in security
Teaching Formal Methods Based on Rewriting Logic and Maude
TFM '09 Proceedings of the 2nd International Conference on Teaching Formal Methods
All about maude - a high-performance logical framework: how to specify, program and verify systems in rewriting logic
Analyzing BGP instances in Maude
FMOODS'11/FORTE'11 Proceedings of the joint 13th IFIP WG 6.1 and 30th IFIP WG 6.1 international conference on Formal techniques for distributed systems
ICTAC'05 Proceedings of the Second international conference on Theoretical Aspects of Computing
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Network protocol design is usually an informal process where debugging is based on successive iterations of a prototype implementation. The feedback provided by a prototype can be indispensable since the requirements are often incomplete at the start. A draw-back of this technique is that errors in protocols can be notoriously difficult to detect by testing alone. Applying formal methods such as theorem proving can greatly increase one's confidence that the protocol is correct. However, formal methods can be tedious to use, rarely support successive design iterations and prototyping, are difficult to scale to entire designs, and typically require a clear understanding of requirements in advance. We investigate how formal simulation based on Maude executable specifications overcomes many of these hurdles. We apply this technique in the early stages of the design of a new security protocol, known as Layer 3 Accounting (L3A), aimed at protecting known vulnerabilities in the wireless accounting infrastructure. The protocol sets up a collection of IPsec security associations that provide the necessary protection. We demonstrate how formal simulation uncovered problems in several successive iterations of the L3A protocol design.