Formal proofs of cryptographic security of Diffie-Hellman-based protocols

  • Authors:
  • Arnab Roy;Anupam Datta;John C. Mitchell

  • Affiliations:
  • Stanford University, Stanford, CA;Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, PA;Stanford University, Stanford, CA

  • Venue:
  • TGC'07 Proceedings of the 3rd conference on Trustworthy global computing
  • Year:
  • 2007

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Abstract

We present axioms and inference rules for reasoning about Diffie-Hellman-based key exchange protocols and use these rules to prove authentication and secrecy properties of two important protocol standards, the Diffie-Hellman variant of Kerberos, and IKEv2, the revised standard key management protocol for IPSEC. The new proof system is sound for an accepted semantics used in cryptographic studies. In the process of applying our system, we uncover a deficiency in Diffie-Hellman Kerberos that is easily repaired.