Theoretical Computer Science - Automated reasoning for security protocol analysis
Towards provable secure neighbor discovery in wireless networks
Proceedings of the 6th ACM workshop on Formal methods in security engineering
Verification of authentication protocols for epistemic goals via SAT compilation
Journal of Computer Science and Technology
Computational Semantics for First-Order Logical Analysis of Cryptographic Protocols
Formal to Practical Security
Analysis of EAP-GPSK authentication protocol
ACNS'08 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Applied cryptography and network security
Formal proofs of cryptographic security of Diffie-Hellman-based protocols
TGC'07 Proceedings of the 3rd conference on Trustworthy global computing
Bayesian Authentication: Quantifying Security of the Hancke-Kuhn Protocol
Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science (ENTCS)
Developing security protocols by refinement
Proceedings of the 17th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Sequential protocol composition in maude-NPA
ESORICS'10 Proceedings of the 15th European conference on Research in computer security
Deriving secrecy in key establishment protocols
ESORICS'06 Proceedings of the 11th European conference on Research in Computer Security
ICDCIT'12 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Distributed Computing and Internet Technology
Sound security protocol transformations
POST'13 Proceedings of the Second international conference on Principles of Security and Trust
| Hi-index | 0.00 |
Authentication and secrecy properties are proved by very different methods: the former by local reasoning, leading to matching knowledge of all principals about the order of their actions, the latter by global reasoning towards the impossibility of knowledge of some data. Hence, proofs conceptually decompose in two parts, each encapsulating the other as an assumption. From this observation, we develop a simple logic of authentication that encapsulates secrecy requirements as assumptions. We apply it within the derivational framework to derive a large class of key distribution protocols based on the authentication properties of their components.