Modeling concurrency with partial orders
International Journal of Parallel Programming
Lecture notes in computer sciences; 218 on Advances in cryptology---CRYPTO 85
Random oracles are practical: a paradigm for designing efficient protocols
CCS '93 Proceedings of the 1st ACM conference on Computer and communications security
EUROCRYPT '93 Workshop on the theory and application of cryptographic techniques on Advances in cryptology
Strand spaces: proving security protocols correct
Journal of Computer Security
Foundations of Cryptography: Basic Tools
Foundations of Cryptography: Basic Tools
Guarded Transitions in Evolving Specifications
AMAST '02 Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Algebraic Methodology and Software Technology
Identification Tokens - or: Solving the Chess Grandmaster Problem
CRYPTO '90 Proceedings of the 10th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Composition and Refinement of Behavioral Specifications
Proceedings of the 16th IEEE international conference on Automated software engineering
A compositional logic for proving security properties of protocols
Journal of Computer Security - Special issue on CSFW14
The faithfulness of abstract protocol analysis: message authentication
Journal of Computer Security - Special issue on ACM conference on computer and communications security, 2001
An Encapsulated Authentication Logic for Reasoning about Key Distribution Protocols
CSFW '05 Proceedings of the 18th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
An RFID Distance Bounding Protocol
SECURECOMM '05 Proceedings of the First International Conference on Security and Privacy for Emerging Areas in Communications Networks
A derivation system and compositional logic for security protocols
Journal of Computer Security
Protocol Composition Logic (PCL)
Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science (ENTCS)
A survey of algebraic properties used in cryptographic protocols
Journal of Computer Security
Multichannel Security Protocols
IEEE Pervasive Computing
Modeling and Verifying Physical Properties of Security Protocols for Wireless Networks
CSF '09 Proceedings of the 2009 22nd IEEE Computer Security Foundations Symposium
CoSP: a general framework for computational soundness proofs
Proceedings of the 16th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Probabilistic polynomial-time semantics for a protocol security logic
ICALP'05 Proceedings of the 32nd international conference on Automata, Languages and Programming
Deriving secrecy in key establishment protocols
ESORICS'06 Proceedings of the 11th European conference on Research in Computer Security
Secure positioning in wireless networks
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
ICDCIT'12 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Distributed Computing and Internet Technology
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As mobile devices pervade physical space, the familiar authentication patterns are becoming insufficient: besides entity authentication, many applications require, e.g., location authentication. Many interesting protocols have been proposed and implemented to provide such strengthened forms of authentication, but there are very few proofs that such protocols satisfy the required security properties. In some cases, the proofs can be provided in the symbolic model. More often, various physical factors invalidate the perfect cryptography assumption, and the symbolic model does not apply. In such cases, the protocol cannot be secure in an absolute logical sense, but only with a high probability. But while probabilistic reasoning is thus necessary, the analysis in the full computational model may not be warranted, since the protocol security does not depend on any computational assumptions, or on attacker's computational power, but only on some guessing chances. We refine the Dolev-Yao algebraic method for protocol analysis by a probabilistic model of guessing, needed to analyze protocols that mix weak cryptography with physical properties of nonstandard communication channels. Applying this model, we provide a precise security proof for a proximity authentication protocol, due to Hancke and Kuhn, that uses probabilistic reasoning to achieve its goals.