Modeling concurrency with partial orders
International Journal of Parallel Programming
Authentication in distributed systems: theory and practice
ACM Transactions on Computer Systems (TOCS)
Authentication and authenticated key exchanges
Designs, Codes and Cryptography
A calculus for access control in distributed systems
ACM Transactions on Programming Languages and Systems (TOPLAS)
Entity authentication and key distribution
CRYPTO '93 Proceedings of the 13th annual international cryptology conference on Advances in cryptology
Network security: private communication in a public world
Network security: private communication in a public world
Strand spaces: proving security protocols correct
Journal of Computer Security
The inductive approach to verifying cryptographic protocols
Journal of Computer Security
Time, clocks, and the ordering of events in a distributed system
Communications of the ACM
Protecting privacy using the decentralized label model
ACM Transactions on Software Engineering and Methodology (TOSEM)
Foundations of Cryptography: Basic Tools
Foundations of Cryptography: Basic Tools
Authenticated Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement Protocols
SAC '98 Proceedings of the Selected Areas in Cryptography
Protocols for Key Establishment and Authentication
Protocols for Key Establishment and Authentication
Information Processing Letters
A compositional logic for proving security properties of protocols
Journal of Computer Security - Special issue on CSFW14
An Encapsulated Authentication Logic for Reasoning about Key Distribution Protocols
CSFW '05 Proceedings of the 18th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
A derivation system and compositional logic for security protocols
Journal of Computer Security
Towards provable secure neighbor discovery in wireless networks
Proceedings of the 6th ACM workshop on Formal methods in security engineering
A Graphical User Interface for Maude-NPA
Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science (ENTCS)
Bayesian Authentication: Quantifying Security of the Hancke-Kuhn Protocol
Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science (ENTCS)
Developing security protocols by refinement
Proceedings of the 17th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
ICDCIT'12 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Distributed Computing and Internet Technology
Inductive proofs of computational secrecy
ESORICS'07 Proceedings of the 12th European conference on Research in Computer Security
Sound security protocol transformations
POST'13 Proceedings of the Second international conference on Principles of Security and Trust
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Secrecy and authenticity properties of protocols are mutually dependent: every authentication is based on some secrets, and every secret must be authenticated. This interdependency is a significant source of complexity in reasoning about security. We describe a method to simplify it, by encapsulating the authenticity assumptions needed in the proofs of secrecy. This complements the method for encapsulating the secrecy assumptions in proofs of authenticity, presented in [1]. While logically straightforward, this idea of encapsulation in general, and the present treatment of secrecy in particular, allow formulating scalable and reusable reasoning patterns about the families of protocols of practical interest. The approach evolved as a design strategy in the Protocol Derivation Assistant (Pda), a semantically based environment and toolkit for derivational approach to security [2,3].