Inductive proofs of computational secrecy

  • Authors:
  • Arnab Roy;Anupam Datta;Ante Derek;John C. Mitchell

  • Affiliations:
  • Stanford University, Stanford, CA;Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, PA;Stanford University, Stanford, CA;Stanford University, Stanford, CA

  • Venue:
  • ESORICS'07 Proceedings of the 12th European conference on Research in Computer Security
  • Year:
  • 2007

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Abstract

Secrecy properties of network protocols assert that no probabilistic polynomial-time distinguisher can win a suitable game presented by a challenger. Because such properties are not determined by trace-by-trace behavior of the protocol, we establish a trace-based protocol condition, suitable for inductive proofs, that guarantees a generic reduction from protocol attacks to attacks on underlying primitives. We use this condition to present a compositional inductive proof system for secrecy, and illustrate the system by giving a modular, formal proof of computational authentication and secrecy properties of Kerberos V5.