Conditional rewriting logic as a unified model of concurrency
Selected papers of the Second Workshop on Concurrency and compositionality
Strand spaces: proving security protocols correct
Journal of Computer Security
Universally composable two-party and multi-party secure computation
STOC '02 Proceedings of the thiry-fourth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Membership algebra as a logical framework for equational specification
WADT '97 Selected papers from the 12th International Workshop on Recent Trends in Algebraic Development Techniques
Breaking and Fixing the Needham-Schroeder Public-Key Protocol Using FDR
TACAs '96 Proceedings of the Second International Workshop on Tools and Algorithms for Construction and Analysis of Systems
Protocol Independence through Disjoint Encryption
CSFW '00 Proceedings of the 13th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Security Protocol Design via Authentication Tests
CSFW '02 Proceedings of the 15th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
A Compositional Logic for Protocol Correctness
CSFW '01 Proceedings of the 14th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
An Encapsulated Authentication Logic for Reasoning about Key Distribution Protocols
CSFW '05 Proceedings of the 18th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
A rewriting-based inference system for the NRL Protocol analyzer and its meta-logical properties
Theoretical Computer Science - Automated reasoning for security protocol analysis
Safely composing security protocols
Formal Methods in System Design
Maude-NPA: Cryptographic Protocol Analysis Modulo Equational Properties
Foundations of Security Analysis and Design V
Searching for shapes in cryptographic protocols
TACAS'07 Proceedings of the 13th international conference on Tools and algorithms for the construction and analysis of systems
Secure positioning in wireless networks
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
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Protocols do not work alone, but together, one protocol relying on another to provide needed services. Many of the problems in cryptographic protocols arise when such composition is done incorrectly or is not well understood. In this paper we discuss an extension to the Maude-NPA syntax and operational semantics to support dynamic sequential composition of protocols, so that protocols can be specified separately and composed when desired. This allows one to reason about many different compositions with minimal changes to the specification. Moreover, we show that, by a simple protocol transformation, we are able to analyze and verify this dynamic composition in the current Maude-NPA tool. We prove soundness and completeness of the protocol transformation with respect to the extended operational semantics, and illustrate our results on some examples.