Verification of authentication protocols for epistemic goals via SAT compilation

Authors:
Kai-Le Su;Qing-Liang Chen;Abdul Sattar;Wei-Ya Yue;Guan-Feng Lv;Xi-Zhong Zheng
Affiliations:
Department of Computer Science, Sun Yat-Sen University, Guangzhou, P.R. China and Institute for Integrated and Intelligent Systems, Griffith University, Brisbane, Qld, Australia;Department of Computer Science, Sun Yat-Sen University, Guangzhou, P.R. China and Department of Computer Science, Brandenburg University of Technology, Cottbus, Germany;Institute for Integrated and Intelligent Systems, Griffith University, Brisbane, Qld, Australia;Department of Computer Science, Sun Yat-Sen University, Guangzhou, P.R. China;College of Computer Science and Technology, Beijing University of Technology, Beijing, P.R. China;Department of Computer Science, Brandenburg University of Technology, Cottbus, Germany
Venue:
Journal of Computer Science and Technology
Year:
2006

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Abstract

This paper introduces a new methodology that uses knowledge structures, a specific form of Kripke semantics for epistemic logic, to analyze communication protocols over hostile networks. The paper particularly focuses on automatic verification of authentication protocols. Our approach is based on the actual definitions of a protocol, not on some difficult-to-establish justifications. The proposed methodology is different from many previous approaches to automatic verification of security protocols in that it is justification-oriented instead of falsification-oriented, i.e., finding bugs in a protocol. The main idea is based on observations: separating a principal executing a run of protocol from the role in the protocol, and inferring a principal's knowledge from the local observations of the principal. And we show analytically and empirically that this model can be easily reduced to Satisfiability (SAT) problem and efficiently implemented by a modern SAT solver.