ACM Transactions on Computer Systems (TOCS)
An attack on the Needham-Schroeder public-key authentication protocol
Information Processing Letters
Evolving algebras 1993: Lipari guide
Specification and validation methods
Fixing a problem in the Helsinki protocol
ACM SIGOPS Operating Systems Review
The inductive approach to verifying cryptographic protocols
Journal of Computer Security
Formal Verification of Cryptographic Protocols: A Survey
ASIACRYPT '94 Proceedings of the 4th International Conference on the Theory and Applications of Cryptology: Advances in Cryptology
Language generation and verification in the NRL protocol analyzer
CSFW '96 Proceedings of the 9th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
A Hierarchy of Authentication Specifications
CSFW '97 Proceedings of the 10th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Verifying authentication protocols with CSP
CSFW '97 Proceedings of the 10th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Honest Ideals on Strand Spaces
CSFW '98 Proceedings of the 11th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Athena: a New Efficient Automatic Checker for Security Protocol Analysis
CSFW '99 Proceedings of the 12th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Invariant Generation Techniques in Cryptographic Protocol Analysis
CSFW '00 Proceedings of the 13th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Universally Composable Security: A New Paradigm for Cryptographic Protocols
FOCS '01 Proceedings of the 42nd IEEE symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
A Semantic Model for Authentication Protocols
SP '93 Proceedings of the 1993 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Verification of authentication protocols for epistemic goals via SAT compilation
Journal of Computer Science and Technology
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A new semantic model in Abstract State Model (ASM) for authentication protocols is presented. It highlights the Woo-Lam's ideas for authentication, which is the strongest one in Lowe's definition hierarchy for entity authentication. Apart from the flexible and natural features in forming and analyzing protocols inherited from ASM, the model defines both authentication and secrecy properties explicitly in first order sentences as invariants. The process of proving security properties with respect to an authentication protocol blends the correctness and secrecy properties together to avoid the potential flaws which may happen when treated separately. The security of revised Helsinki protocol is shown as a case study. The new model is different from the previous ones in ASMs.