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The faithfulness of abstract protocol analysis: message authentication
Journal of Computer Security - Special issue on ACM conference on computer and communications security, 2001
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Journal of Computer Security
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This paper presents a general approach for analysis and verification of authentication properties in the language of Communicating Sequential Processes (CSP). It is illustrated by an examination of the Needham-Schroeder public-key protocol. The contribution of this paper is to develop a specific theory appropriate to the analysis of authentication protocols, built on top of the general CSP semantic framework. This approach aims to combine the ability to express such protocols in a natural and precise way with the facility to reason formally about the properties they exhibit.