A formal approach for reasoning about a class of diffie-hellman protocols

Authors:
Rob Delicata;Steve Schneider
Affiliations:
Department of Computing, University of Surrey, Guildford, UK;Department of Computing, University of Surrey, Guildford, UK
Venue:
FAST'05 Proceedings of the Third international conference on Formal Aspects in Security and Trust
Year:
2005

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Abstract

We present a framework for reasoning about secrecy in a class of Diffie-Hellman protocols. The technique, which shares a conceptual origin with the idea of a rank function, uses the notion of a message-template to determine whether a given value is generable by an intruder in a protocol model. Traditionally, the rich algebraic structure of Diffie-Hellman messages has made it difficult to reason about such protocols using formal, rather than complexity-theoretic, techniques. We describe the approach in the context of the MTI A(0) protocol, and derive the conditions under which this protocol can be considered secure.