Modelling the relative strength of security protocols

Authors:
Ho Chung;Clifford Neuman
Affiliations:
University of Southern California, Los Angeles;University of Southern California, Los Angeles
Venue:
Proceedings of the 2nd ACM workshop on Quality of protection
Year:
2006

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Abstract

In this paper, we present a way to think about the relative strength of security protocols using SoS, a lattice-theoretic representation of security strength. In particular, we discuss how the model can be used, present the TLS protocol as a compelling real world example, show how it is modeled, and then explain how lattice-theoretic properties can be used to evaluate security protocols.