Provably secure session key distribution: the three party case
STOC '95 Proceedings of the twenty-seventh annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
CAPSL: Common Authentication Protocol Specification Language
NSPW '96 Proceedings of the 1996 workshop on New security paradigms
The inductive approach to verifying cryptographic protocols
Journal of Computer Security
Journal of Automated Reasoning
Breaking and Fixing the Needham-Schroeder Public-Key Protocol Using FDR
TACAs '96 Proceedings of the Second International Workshop on Tools and Algorithms for Construction and Analysis of Systems
Kerberos Version 4: Inductive Analysis of the Secrecy Goals
ESORICS '98 Proceedings of the 5th European Symposium on Research in Computer Security
Entity Authentication and Key Distribution
CRYPTO '93 Proceedings of the 13th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Mechanising BAN Kerberos by the Inductive Method
CAV '98 Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Computer Aided Verification
Language generation and verification in the NRL protocol analyzer
CSFW '96 Proceedings of the 9th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Casper: A Compiler for the Analysis of Security Protocols
CSFW '97 Proceedings of the 10th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Verifying authentication protocols with CSP
CSFW '97 Proceedings of the 10th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Athena: a New Efficient Automatic Checker for Security Protocol Analysis
CSFW '99 Proceedings of the 12th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Invariant Generation Techniques in Cryptographic Protocol Analysis
CSFW '00 Proceedings of the 13th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Towards Automatic Verification of Authentication Protocols on an Unbounded Network
CSFW '00 Proceedings of the 13th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
How to Prevent Type Flaw Attacks on Security Protocols
CSFW '00 Proceedings of the 13th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
An Efficient Cryptographic Protocol Verifier Based on Prolog Rules
CSFW '01 Proceedings of the 14th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Finite-state analysis of SSL 3.0
SSYM'98 Proceedings of the 7th conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 7
Sound methods and effective tools for model-based security engineering with UML
Proceedings of the 27th international conference on Software engineering
Code security analysis with assertions
Proceedings of the 20th IEEE/ACM international Conference on Automated software engineering
Automatic verification of correspondences for security protocols
Journal of Computer Security
Efficient construction of machine-checked symbolic protocol security proofs
Journal of Computer Security
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We describe a verification method for cryptographic protocols, based on first-order invariants. For typical protocols, a suitable invariant can be generated mechanically from the program text, allowing safety properties to be proved by ordinary first-order reasoning.The method has been implemented in an automatic verifier, TAPS, that proves safety properties comparable to those in published Isabelle verifications, but does so much faster with little or no guidance from the user. TAPS has verified properties of about 100 protocols, including all but three protocols from the Clark and Jacob survey; on average, these verifications require less than a second of CPU time and less than 4 bytes of hints from the user.