How to simultaneously exchange secrets by general assumptions
CCS '94 Proceedings of the 2nd ACM Conference on Computer and communications security
Inductive analysis of the Internet protocol TLS
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
The inductive approach to verifying cryptographic protocols
Journal of Computer Security
Kerberos Version 4: Inductive Analysis of the Secrecy Goals
ESORICS '98 Proceedings of the 5th European Symposium on Research in Computer Security
Formal Verification of Cardholder Registration in SET
ESORICS '00 Proceedings of the 6th European Symposium on Research in Computer Security
Mechanising a Protocol for Smart Cards
E-SMART '01 Proceedings of the International Conference on Research in Smart Cards: Smart Card Programming and Security
Modelling Agents' Knowledge Inductively
Proceedings of the 7th International Workshop on Security Protocols
Mechanising BAN Kerberos by the Inductive Method
CAV '98 Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Computer Aided Verification
Verifying authentication protocols with CSP
CSFW '97 Proceedings of the 10th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
An Efficient Non-repudiation Protocol
CSFW '97 Proceedings of the 10th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Formal Analysis of a Non-Repudiation Protocol
CSFW '98 Proceedings of the 11th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
A fair non-repudiation protocol
SP '96 Proceedings of the 1996 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
The modelling and analysis of security protocols: the csp approach
The modelling and analysis of security protocols: the csp approach
Automatic Methods for Analyzing Non-repudiation Protocols with an Active Intruder
Formal Aspects in Security and Trust
Is the verification problem for cryptographic protocols solved?
Proceedings of the 11th international conference on Security Protocols
On the quest for impartiality: design and analysis of a fair non-repudiation protocol
ICICS'05 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Information and Communications Security
A formal analysis of fairness and non-repudiation in the RSA-CEGD protocol
ICCSA'05 Proceedings of the 2005 international conference on Computational Science and Its Applications - Volume Part IV
On the formal analyses of the zhou-gollmann non-repudiation protocol
FAST'05 Proceedings of the Third international conference on Formal Aspects in Security and Trust
Secure untrusted binaries — provably!
FAST'05 Proceedings of the Third international conference on Formal Aspects in Security and Trust
Nuovo DRM Paradiso: Designing a Secure, Verified, Fair Exchange DRM Scheme
Fundamenta Informaticae - Fundamentals of Software Engineering 2007: Selected Contributions
Towards verifying voter privacy through unlinkability
ESSoS'13 Proceedings of the 5th international conference on Engineering Secure Software and Systems
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A non-repudiation protocol of Zhou and Gollmann [18] has been mechanically verified. A non-repudiation protocol gives each party evidence that the other party indeed participated, evidence sufficient to present to a judge in the event of a dispute. We use the theorem-prover Isabelle [10] and model the security protocol by an inductive definition, as described elsewhere [1,12]. We prove the protocol goals of validity of evidence and of fairness using simple strategies. A typical theorem states that a given piece of evidence can only exist if a specific event took place involving the other party.