Paradigm shifts in protocol analysis
Proceedings of the 1999 workshop on New security paradigms
Using encryption for authentication in large networks of computers
Communications of the ACM
Evolution of Fair Non-repudiation with TTP
ACISP '99 Proceedings of the 4th Australasian Conference on Information Security and Privacy
Breaking and Fixing the Needham-Schroeder Public-Key Protocol Using FDR
TACAs '96 Proceedings of the Second International Workshop on Tools and Algorithms for Construction and Analysis of Systems
Mechanical Proofs about a Non-repudiation Protocol
TPHOLs '01 Proceedings of the 14th International Conference on Theorem Proving in Higher Order Logics
Formal Analysis of a Non-Repudiation Protocol
CSFW '98 Proceedings of the 11th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
On Unifying Some Cryptographic Protocol Logics
SP '94 Proceedings of the 1994 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
A fair non-repudiation protocol
SP'96 Proceedings of the 1996 IEEE conference on Security and privacy
Automatic Methods for Analyzing Non-repudiation Protocols with an Active Intruder
Formal Aspects in Security and Trust
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Most of the previous comparisons of formal analyses of security protocols have concentrated on the tabulation of attacks found or missed. More recent investigations suggest that such cursory comparisons can be misleading. The original context of a protocol as well as the operating assumptions of the analyst have to be taken into account before conducting comparative evaluations of different analyses of a protocol. In this paper, we present four analyses of the Zhou-Gollmann non-repudiation protocol and trace the differences in the results of the four analyses to the differences in the assumed contexts. This shows that even contemporary analyses may unknowingly deviate from a protocol's original context.