Using encryption for authentication in large networks of computers
Communications of the ACM
The faithfulness of abstract protocol analysis: message authentication
CCS '01 Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Computer and Communications Security
A Hierarchy of Authentication Specifications
CSFW '97 Proceedings of the 10th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
SP '00 Proceedings of the 2000 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
A composable cryptographic library with nested operations
Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
A compositional logic for proving security properties of protocols
Journal of Computer Security - Special issue on CSFW14
An Encapsulated Authentication Logic for Reasoning about Key Distribution Protocols
CSFW '05 Proceedings of the 18th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Computational and Information-Theoretic Soundness and Completeness of Formal Encryption
CSFW '05 Proceedings of the 18th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
A derivation system and compositional logic for security protocols
Journal of Computer Security
Protocol Composition Logic (PCL)
Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science (ENTCS)
Completeness theorems for the Abadi-Rogaway language of encrypted expressions
Journal of Computer Security - Special issue on WITS'02
On the security of public key protocols
SFCS '81 Proceedings of the 22nd Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Completeness and Counter-Example Generations of a Basic Protocol Logic
Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science (ENTCS)
Public-key encryption in a multi-user setting: security proofs and improvements
EUROCRYPT'00 Proceedings of the 19th international conference on Theory and application of cryptographic techniques
Computational semantics for basic protocol logic: a stochastic approach
ASIAN'07 Proceedings of the 12th Asian computing science conference on Advances in computer science: computer and network security
Guessing attacks and the computational soundness of static equivalence
FOSSACS'06 Proceedings of the 9th European joint conference on Foundations of Software Science and Computation Structures
Probabilistic polynomial-time semantics for a protocol security logic
ICALP'05 Proceedings of the 32nd international conference on Automata, Languages and Programming
Computationally sound implementations of equational theories against passive adversaries
ICALP'05 Proceedings of the 32nd international conference on Automata, Languages and Programming
Soundness of formal encryption in the presence of key-cycles
ESORICS'05 Proceedings of the 10th European conference on Research in Computer Security
Universally composable symbolic analysis of mutual authentication and key-exchange protocols
TCC'06 Proceedings of the Third conference on Theory of Cryptography
Security proof with dishonest keys
POST'12 Proceedings of the First international conference on Principles of Security and Trust
Computationally complete symbolic attacker and key exchange
Proceedings of the 2013 ACM SIGSAC conference on Computer & communications security
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This paper is concerned about relating formal and computational models of cryptography in case of active adversaries when formal security analysis is done with first order logic As opposed to earlier treatments, we introduce a new, fully probabilistic method to assign computational semantics to the syntax. The idea is to make use of the usual mathematical treatment of stochastic processes, hence be able to treat arbitrary probability distributions, non-negligible probability of collision, causal dependence or independence, and so on. We present this via considering a simple example of such a formal model, the Basic Protocol Logic by K. Hasebe and M. Okada [20], but we think the technique is suitable for a wide range of formal methods for protocol correctness proofs. We first review our framework of proof-system, BPL, for proving correctness of authentication protocols, and provide computational semantics. Then we give a full proof of the soundness theorem. We also comment on the differences of our method and that of Computational PCL.