Strand spaces: proving security protocols correct
Journal of Computer Security
Constraints in computational logics: theory and applications
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Relations Among Notions of Security for Public-Key Encryption Schemes
CRYPTO '98 Proceedings of the 18th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
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CSFW '06 Proceedings of the 19th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
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Information and Computation
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IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing
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Proceedings of the 36th annual ACM SIGPLAN-SIGACT symposium on Principles of programming languages
EUROCRYPT '09 Proceedings of the 28th Annual International Conference on Advances in Cryptology: the Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques
Computational Semantics for First-Order Logical Analysis of Cryptographic Protocols
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Computational soundness for key exchange protocols with symmetric encryption
Proceedings of the 16th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Journal of Computer Security - 18th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Symposium (CSF 18)
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EUROCRYPT'00 Proceedings of the 19th international conference on Theory and application of cryptographic techniques
Probabilistic polynomial-time semantics for a protocol security logic
ICALP'05 Proceedings of the 32nd international conference on Automata, Languages and Programming
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ESOP'05 Proceedings of the 14th European conference on Programming Languages and Systems
Towards unconditional soundness: computationally complete symbolic attacker
POST'12 Proceedings of the First international conference on Principles of Security and Trust
Computational soundness without protocol restrictions
Proceedings of the 2012 ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Tractable inference systems: an extension with a deducibility predicate
CADE'13 Proceedings of the 24th international conference on Automated Deduction
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Recently, Bana and Comon-Lundh introduced the notion of computationally complete symbolic attacker to deliver unconditional computational soundness to symbolic protocol verification. First we explain the relationship between their technique and Fitting's embedding of classical logic into S4. Then, based on predicates for "key usability", we provide an axiomatic system in their framework to handle secure encryption when keys are allowed to be sent. We examine both IND-CCA2 and KDM-CCA2 encryptions, both symmetric and asymmetric situations. For unforgeability, we consider INT-CTXT encryptions. This technique does not require the usual limitations of computational soundness such as the absence of dynamic corruption, the absence of key-cycles or unambiguous parsing of bit strings. In particular, if a key-cycle possibly corrupts CCA2 encryption, our technique delivers an attack. If it does not endanger security, the security proof goes through. We illustrate how our notions can be applied in protocol proofs.