Automating computational proofs for public-key-based key exchange
ProvSec'10 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Provable security
Efficient symbolic execution for analysing cryptographic protocol implementations
ESSoS'11 Proceedings of the Third international conference on Engineering secure software and systems
A Survey of Symbolic Methods in Computational Analysis of Cryptographic Systems
Journal of Automated Reasoning
Beyond provable security verifiable IND-CCA security of OAEP
CT-RSA'11 Proceedings of the 11th international conference on Topics in cryptology: CT-RSA 2011
Verified Cryptographic Implementations for TLS
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC) - Special Issue on Computer and Communications Security
Formally based semi-automatic implementation of an open security protocol
Journal of Systems and Software
ICDCIT'12 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Distributed Computing and Internet Technology
Security protocol verification: symbolic and computational models
POST'12 Proceedings of the First international conference on Principles of Security and Trust
Security proof with dishonest keys
POST'12 Proceedings of the First international conference on Principles of Security and Trust
Towards unconditional soundness: computationally complete symbolic attacker
POST'12 Proceedings of the First international conference on Principles of Security and Trust
Computational verification of C protocol implementations by symbolic execution
Proceedings of the 2012 ACM conference on Computer and communications security
A vulnerability in the UMTS and LTE authentication and key agreement protocols
MMM-ACNS'12 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Mathematical Methods, Models and Architectures for Computer Network Security: computer network security
Proved generation of implementations from computationally secure protocol specifications
POST'13 Proceedings of the Second international conference on Principles of Security and Trust
Computationally complete symbolic attacker and key exchange
Proceedings of the 2013 ACM SIGSAC conference on Computer & communications security
LICS: Logic in Computer Security -- Some Attacker's Models and Related Decision Problems
LICS '13 Proceedings of the 2013 28th Annual ACM/IEEE Symposium on Logic in Computer Science
Efficient construction of machine-checked symbolic protocol security proofs
Journal of Computer Security
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We present a new mechanized prover for secrecy properties of security protocols. In contrast to most previous provers, our tool does not rely on the Dolev-Yao model, but on the computational model. It produces proofs presented as sequences of games; these games are formalized in a probabilistic polynomial-time process calculus. Our tool provides a generic method for specifying security properties of the cryptographic primitives, which can handle shared-key and public-key encryption, signatures, message authentication codes, and hash functions. Our tool produces proofs valid for a number of sessions polynomial in the security parameter, in the presence of an active adversary. We have implemented our tool and tested it on a number of examples of protocols from the literature.