Automating computational proofs for public-key-based key exchange

  • Authors:
  • Long Ngo;Colin Boyd;Juan González Nieto

  • Affiliations:
  • Information Security Institute, Queensland University of Technology, Brisbane, QLD, Australia;Information Security Institute, Queensland University of Technology, Brisbane, QLD, Australia;Information Security Institute, Queensland University of Technology, Brisbane, QLD, Australia

  • Venue:
  • ProvSec'10 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Provable security
  • Year:
  • 2010

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Abstract

We present an approach to automating computationally sound proofs of key exchange protocols based on public-key encryption. We show that satisfying the property called occultness in the Dolev-Yao model guarantees the security of a related key exchange protocol in a simple computational model. Security in this simpler model has been shown to imply security in a Bellare-Rogaway-like model. Furthermore, the occultness in the Dolev-Yao model can be searched automatically by a mechanisable procedure. Thus automated proofs for key exchange protocols in the computational model can be achieved. We illustrate the method using the well-known Lowe-Needham-Schroeder protocol.