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The modelling and analysis of security protocols: the csp approach
The modelling and analysis of security protocols: the csp approach
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The AVISPA tool for the automated validation of internet security protocols and applications
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Computational soundness without protocol restrictions
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Computational soundness of coinductive symbolic security under active attacks
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Computationally complete symbolic attacker and key exchange
Proceedings of the 2013 ACM SIGSAC conference on Computer & communications security
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LICS: Logic in Computer Security -- Some Attacker's Models and Related Decision Problems
LICS '13 Proceedings of the 2013 28th Annual ACM/IEEE Symposium on Logic in Computer Science
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We consider the question of the adequacy of symbolic models versus computational models for the verification of security protocols. We neither try to include properties in the symbolic model that reflect the properties of the computational primitives nor add computational requirements that enforce the soundness of the symbolic model. We propose in this paper a different approach: everything is possible in the symbolic model, unless it contradicts a computational assumption. In this way, we obtain unconditional soundness almost by construction. And we do not need to assume the absence of dynamic corruption or the absence of key-cycles, which are examples of hypotheses that are always used in related works. We set the basic framework, for arbitrary cryptographic primitives and arbitrary protocols, however for trace security properties only.