Random oracles are practical: a paradigm for designing efficient protocols
CCS '93 Proceedings of the 1st ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Mobile values, new names, and secure communication
POPL '01 Proceedings of the 28th ACM SIGPLAN-SIGACT symposium on Principles of programming languages
Universal Padding Schemes for RSA
CRYPTO '02 Proceedings of the 22nd Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
CRYPTO '92 Proceedings of the 12th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
The Gap-Problems: A New Class of Problems for the Security of Cryptographic Schemes
PKC '01 Proceedings of the 4th International Workshop on Practice and Theory in Public Key Cryptography: Public Key Cryptography
Simplified OAEP for the RSA and Rabin Functions
CRYPTO '01 Proceedings of the 21st Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
CSFW '00 Proceedings of the 13th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
RSA-OAEP Is Secure under the RSA Assumption
Journal of Cryptology
A Computationally Sound Mechanized Prover for Security Protocols
SP '06 Proceedings of the 2006 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Logics for reasoning about cryptographic constructions
Journal of Computer and System Sciences - Special issue on FOCS 2003
IEICE Transactions on Fundamentals of Electronics, Communications and Computer Sciences
Reconciling Two Views of Cryptography (The Computational Soundness of Formal Encryption)
Journal of Cryptology
Towards automated proofs for asymmetric encryption schemes in the random oracle model
Proceedings of the 15th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Computationally sound implementations of equational theories against passive adversaries
Information and Computation
YAPA: A Generic Tool for Computing Intruder Knowledge
RTA '09 Proceedings of the 20th International Conference on Rewriting Techniques and Applications
Computing Knowledge in Security Protocols under Convergent Equational Theories
CADE-22 Proceedings of the 22nd International Conference on Automated Deduction
Factorization of a 768-bit RSA modulus
CRYPTO'10 Proceedings of the 30th annual conference on Advances in cryptology
Inductive trace properties for computational security
Journal of Computer Security - 7th International Workshop on Issues in the Theory of Security (WITS'07)
A Survey of Symbolic Methods in Computational Analysis of Cryptographic Systems
Journal of Automated Reasoning
Beyond provable security verifiable IND-CCA security of OAEP
CT-RSA'11 Proceedings of the 11th international conference on Topics in cryptology: CT-RSA 2011
Computer-aided security proofs for the working cryptographer
CRYPTO'11 Proceedings of the 31st annual conference on Advances in cryptology
Security protocol verification: symbolic and computational models
POST'12 Proceedings of the First international conference on Principles of Security and Trust
Towards unconditional soundness: computationally complete symbolic attacker
POST'12 Proceedings of the First international conference on Principles of Security and Trust
On the security of public key protocols
IEEE Transactions on Information Theory
Verified security of redundancy-free encryption from Rabin and RSA
Proceedings of the 2012 ACM conference on Computer and communications security
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Computer-aided verification provides effective means of analyzing the security of cryptographic primitives. However, it has remained a challenge to achieve fully automated analyses yielding guarantees that hold against computational (rather than symbolic) attacks. This paper meets this challenge for public-key encryption schemes built from trapdoor permutations and hash functions. Using a novel combination of techniques from computational and symbolic cryptography, we present proof systems for analyzing the chosen-plaintext and chosen-ciphertext security of such schemes in the random oracle model. Building on these proof systems, we develop a toolset that bundles together fully automated proof and attack finding algorithms. We use this toolset to build a comprehensive database of encryption schemes that records attacks against insecure schemes, and proofs with concrete bounds for secure ones.