Mobile values, new names, and secure communication
POPL '01 Proceedings of the 28th ACM SIGPLAN-SIGACT symposium on Principles of programming languages
An Efficient Cryptographic Protocol Verifier Based on Prolog Rules
CSFW '01 Proceedings of the 14th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Universally Composable Security: A New Paradigm for Cryptographic Protocols
FOCS '01 Proceedings of the 42nd IEEE symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
A composable cryptographic library with nested operations
Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Symmetric Encryption in a Simulatable Dolev-Yao Style Cryptographic Library
CSFW '04 Proceedings of the 17th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Journal of Computer Security - Special issue on ACM conference on computer and communications security, 2001
Automated Verification of Selected Equivalences for Security Protocols
LICS '05 Proceedings of the 20th Annual IEEE Symposium on Logic in Computer Science
Deciding security of protocols against off-line guessing attacks
Proceedings of the 12th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
A Computationally Sound Mechanized Prover for Security Protocols
SP '06 Proceedings of the 2006 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Verified Interoperable Implementations of Security Protocols
CSFW '06 Proceedings of the 19th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Simulation-Based Security with Inexhaustible Interactive Turing Machines
CSFW '06 Proceedings of the 19th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Computationally Sound Compositional Logic for Key Exchange Protocols
CSFW '06 Proceedings of the 19th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
CSF '08 Proceedings of the 2008 21st IEEE Computer Security Foundations Symposium
Computational soundness of observational equivalence
Proceedings of the 15th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Using ProVerif to Analyze Protocols with Diffie-Hellman Exponentiation
CSF '09 Proceedings of the 2009 22nd IEEE Computer Security Foundations Symposium
Universally Composable Symmetric Encryption
CSF '09 Proceedings of the 2009 22nd IEEE Computer Security Foundations Symposium
Separating Trace Mapping and Reactive Simulatability Soundness: The Case of Adaptive Corruption
Foundations and Applications of Security Analysis
Deciding key cycles for security protocols
LPAR'06 Proceedings of the 13th international conference on Logic for Programming, Artificial Intelligence, and Reasoning
Computationally sound symbolic secrecy in the presence of hash functions
FSTTCS'06 Proceedings of the 26th international conference on Foundations of Software Technology and Theoretical Computer Science
Computationally sound, automated proofs for security protocols
ESOP'05 Proceedings of the 14th European conference on Programming Languages and Systems
The AVISPA tool for the automated validation of internet security protocols and applications
CAV'05 Proceedings of the 17th international conference on Computer Aided Verification
Universally composable symbolic analysis of mutual authentication and key-exchange protocols
TCC'06 Proceedings of the Third conference on Theory of Cryptography
Adaptive soundness of static equivalence
ESORICS'07 Proceedings of the 12th European conference on Research in Computer Security
Ideal key derivation and encryption in simulation-based security
CT-RSA'11 Proceedings of the 11th international conference on Topics in cryptology: CT-RSA 2011
A composable computational soundness notion
Proceedings of the 18th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Security proof with dishonest keys
POST'12 Proceedings of the First international conference on Principles of Security and Trust
Computational verification of C protocol implementations by symbolic execution
Proceedings of the 2012 ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Computational soundness of coinductive symbolic security under active attacks
TCC'13 Proceedings of the 10th theory of cryptography conference on Theory of Cryptography
Future Generation Computer Systems
Computationally complete symbolic attacker and key exchange
Proceedings of the 2013 ACM SIGSAC conference on Computer & communications security
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Formal analysis of security protocols based on symbolic models has been very successful in finding flaws in published protocols and proving protocols secure, using automated tools. An important question is whether this kind of formal analysis implies security guarantees in the strong sense of modern cryptography. Initiated by the seminal work of Abadi and Rogaway, this question has been investigated and numerous positive results showing this so-called computational soundness of formal analysis have been obtained. However, for the case of active adversaries and protocols that use symmetric encryption computational soundness has remained a challenge. In this paper, we show the first general computational soundness result for key exchange protocols with symmetric encryption, along the lines of a paper by Canetti and Herzog on protocols with public-key encryption. More specifically, we develop a symbolic, automatically checkable criterion, based on observational equivalence, and show that a key exchange protocol that satisfies this criterion realizes a key exchange functionality in the sense of universal composability. Our results hold under standard cryptographic assumptions.