A composable cryptographic library with nested operations
Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
A derivation system and compositional logic for security protocols
Journal of Computer Security
On the security of public key protocols
SFCS '81 Proceedings of the 22nd Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Completeness and Counter-Example Generations of a Basic Protocol Logic
Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science (ENTCS)
Probabilistic polynomial-time semantics for a protocol security logic
ICALP'05 Proceedings of the 32nd international conference on Automata, Languages and Programming
Computational Semantics for First-Order Logical Analysis of Cryptographic Protocols
Formal to Practical Security
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This paper relates formal and computational models of cryptography in case of active adversaries when formal security analysis is done with first order logic. Instead of the way Datta et al. defined computational semantics to their Protocol Composition Logic, we introduce a new, fully probabilistic method to assign computational semantics to the syntax. We present this via considering a simple example of such a formal model, the Basic Protocol Logic by K. Hasebe and M. Okada [7], but the technique is suitable for extensions to more complex situations such as PCL. We make use of the usual mathematical treatment of stochastic processes, hence are able to treat arbitrary probability distributions, non-negligible probability of collision, causal dependence or independence.