Computationally sound mechanized proofs for basic and public-key Kerberos

  • Authors:
  • B. Blanchet;A. D. Jaggard;A. Scedrov;J.-K. Tsay

  • Affiliations:
  • Supérieure & INRIA;Rutgers University;University of Pennsylvania;University of Pennsylvania

  • Venue:
  • Proceedings of the 2008 ACM symposium on Information, computer and communications security
  • Year:
  • 2008

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Abstract

We present a computationally sound mechanized analysis of Kerberos 5, both with and without its public-key extension PKINIT. We prove authentication and key secrecy properties using the prover CryptoVerif, which works directly in the computational model; these are the first mechanical proofs of a full industrial protocol at the computational level. We also generalize the notion of key usability and use CryptoVerif to prove that this definition is satisfied by keys in Kerberos.