Breaking and fixing public-key Kerberos
Information and Computation
Computationally sound mechanized proofs for basic and public-key Kerberos
Proceedings of the 2008 ACM symposium on Information, computer and communications security
Verified interoperable implementations of security protocols
ACM Transactions on Programming Languages and Systems (TOPLAS)
The layered games framework for specifications and analysis of security protocols
International Journal of Applied Cryptography
Threshold Homomorphic Encryption in the Universally Composable Cryptographic Library
ProvSec '08 Proceedings of the 2nd International Conference on Provable Security
Type-Based Automated Verification of Authenticity in Cryptographic Protocols
ESOP '09 Proceedings of the 18th European Symposium on Programming Languages and Systems: Held as Part of the Joint European Conferences on Theory and Practice of Software, ETAPS 2009
Verification of Correspondence Assertions in a Calculus for Mobile Ad Hoc Networks
Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science (ENTCS)
Type-based verification of correspondence assertions for communication protocols
APLAS'07 Proceedings of the 5th Asian conference on Programming languages and systems
Application of dependency graphs to security protocol analysis
TGC'07 Proceedings of the 3rd conference on Trustworthy global computing
A Survey of Symbolic Methods in Computational Analysis of Cryptographic Systems
Journal of Automated Reasoning
Composition theorems without pre-established session identifiers
Proceedings of the 18th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Verified Cryptographic Implementations for TLS
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC) - Special Issue on Computer and Communications Security
Security protocol verification: symbolic and computational models
POST'12 Proceedings of the First international conference on Principles of Security and Trust
Computational verification of C protocol implementations by symbolic execution
Proceedings of the 2012 ACM conference on Computer and communications security
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We present a new mechanized prover for showing correspondence assertions for cryptographic protocols in the computational model. Correspondence assertions are useful in particular for establishing authentication. Our technique produces proofs by sequences of games, as standard in cryptography. These proofs are valid for a number of sessions polynomial in the security parameter, in the presence of an active adversary. Our technique can handle a wide variety of cryptographic primitives, including shared- and public-key encryption, signatures, message authentication codes, and hash functions. It has been implemented in the tool CryptoVerif and successfully tested on examples from the literature.