Threshold Homomorphic Encryption in the Universally Composable Cryptographic Library

  • Authors:
  • Peeter Laud;Long Ngo

  • Affiliations:
  • Tartu University, and Cybernetica AS,;Tartu University,

  • Venue:
  • ProvSec '08 Proceedings of the 2nd International Conference on Provable Security
  • Year:
  • 2008

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Abstract

The universally composable cryptographic library by Backes, Pfitzmann and Waidner provides Dolev-Yao-like, but cryptographically sound abstractions to common cryptographic primitives like encryptions and signatures. The library has been used to give the correctness proofs of various protocols; while the arguments in such proofs are similar to the ones done with the Dolev-Yao model that has been researched for a couple of decades already, the conclusions that such arguments provide are cryptographically sound. Various interesting protocols, for example e-voting, make extensive use of primitives that the library currently does not provide. The library can certainly be extended, and in this paper we provide one such extension -- we add threshold homomorphic encryption to the universally composable cryptographic library and demonstrate its usefulness by (re)proving the security of a well-known e-voting protocol.