The reactive simulatability (RSIM) framework for asynchronous systems
Information and Computation
Composable Formal Security Analysis: Juggling Soundness, Simplicity and Efficiency
ICALP '08 Proceedings of the 35th international colloquium on Automata, Languages and Programming, Part II
Computationally Sound Symbolic Analysis of Probabilistic Protocols with Ideal Setups
ProvSec '08 Proceedings of the 2nd International Conference on Provable Security
Threshold Homomorphic Encryption in the Universally Composable Cryptographic Library
ProvSec '08 Proceedings of the 2nd International Conference on Provable Security
Real-or-random Key Secrecy of the Otway-Rees Protocol via a Symbolic Security Proof
Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science (ENTCS)
On simulatability soundness and mapping soundness of symbolic cryptography
FSTTCS'07 Proceedings of the 27th international conference on Foundations of software technology and theoretical computer science
A Survey of Symbolic Methods in Computational Analysis of Cryptographic Systems
Journal of Automated Reasoning
Limits of the BRSIM/UC soundness of dolev-yao models with hashes
ESORICS'06 Proceedings of the 11th European conference on Research in Computer Security
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We present the first cryptographically sound Dolev-Yao-style security proof of a comprehensive electronic payment system. The payment system is a slightly simplified variant of the 3KP payment system and comprises a variety of different security requirements ranging from basic ones like the impossibility of unauthorized payments to more sophisticated properties like disputability. We show that the payment system is secure against arbitrary active attacks, including arbitrary concurrent protocol runs and arbitrary manipulation of bitstrings within polynomial time if the protocol is implemented using provably secure cryptographic primitives. Although we achieve security under cryptographic definitions, our proof does not have to deal with probabilistic aspects of cryptography and is hence within the scope of current proof tools. The reason is that we exploit a recently proposed Dolev-Yao-style cryptographic library with a provably secure cryptographic implementation. Together with composition and preservation theorems of the underlying model, this allows us to perform the actual proof effort in a deterministic setting corresponding to a slightly extended Dolev-Yao model.