Random oracles are practical: a paradigm for designing efficient protocols
CCS '93 Proceedings of the 1st ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Perfectly one-way probabilistic hash functions (preliminary version)
STOC '98 Proceedings of the thirtieth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Composition and integrity preservation of secure reactive systems
Proceedings of the 7th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
The inductive approach to verifying cryptographic protocols
Journal of Computer Security
Semantics and Program Analysis of Computationally Secure Information Flow
ESOP '01 Proceedings of the 10th European Symposium on Programming Languages and Systems
Formal Eavesdropping and Its Computational Interpretation
TACS '01 Proceedings of the 4th International Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Software
Universally Composable Commitments
CRYPTO '01 Proceedings of the 21st Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Towards Realizing Random Oracles: Hash Functions That Hide All Partial Information
CRYPTO '97 Proceedings of the 17th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Universally Composable Notions of Key Exchange and Secure Channels
EUROCRYPT '02 Proceedings of the International Conference on the Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques: Advances in Cryptology
Reconciling Two Views of Cryptography (The Computational Soundness of Formal Encryption)
TCS '00 Proceedings of the International Conference IFIP on Theoretical Computer Science, Exploring New Frontiers of Theoretical Informatics
A Linguistic Characterization of Bounded Oracle Computation and Probabilistic Polynomial Time
FOCS '98 Proceedings of the 39th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
An Efficient Cryptographic Protocol Verifier Based on Prolog Rules
CSFW '01 Proceedings of the 14th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Universally Composable Security: A New Paradigm for Cryptographic Protocols
FOCS '01 Proceedings of the 42nd IEEE symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
A Model for Asynchronous Reactive Systems and its Application to Secure Message Transmission
SP '01 Proceedings of the 2001 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Cryptographic protocols
Logics for Reasoning about Cryptographic Constructions
FOCS '03 Proceedings of the 44th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
A composable cryptographic library with nested operations
Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Symmetric Encryption in a Simulatable Dolev-Yao Style Cryptographic Library
CSFW '04 Proceedings of the 17th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
A Cryptographically Sound Dolev-Yao Style Security Proof of an Electronic Payment System
CSFW '05 Proceedings of the 18th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Secrecy types for a simulatable cryptographic library
Proceedings of the 12th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
A Computationally Sound Mechanized Prover for Security Protocols
SP '06 Proceedings of the 2006 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Cryptographically Sound Theorem Proving
CSFW '06 Proceedings of the 19th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Theory and application of trapdoor functions
SFCS '82 Proceedings of the 23rd Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Probabilistic polynomial-time semantics for a protocol security logic
ICALP'05 Proceedings of the 32nd international conference on Automata, Languages and Programming
Limits of the cryptographic realization of dolev-yao-style XOR
ESORICS'05 Proceedings of the 10th European conference on Research in Computer Security
Games and the impossibility of realizable ideal functionality
TCC'06 Proceedings of the Third conference on Theory of Cryptography
Universally composable symbolic analysis of mutual authentication and key-exchange protocols
TCC'06 Proceedings of the Third conference on Theory of Cryptography
A cryptographically sound security proof of the Needham-Schroeder-Lowe public-key protocol
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
Sound and complete computational interpretation of symbolic hashes in the standard model
Theoretical Computer Science
Threshold Homomorphic Encryption in the Universally Composable Cryptographic Library
ProvSec '08 Proceedings of the 2nd International Conference on Provable Security
CoSP: a general framework for computational soundness proofs
Proceedings of the 16th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Formal proofs of cryptographic security of Diffie-Hellman-based protocols
TGC'07 Proceedings of the 3rd conference on Trustworthy global computing
Computational soundness of symbolic zero-knowledge proofs
Journal of Computer Security - 7th International Workshop on Issues in the Theory of Security (WITS'07)
EC-RAC: enriching a capacious RFID attack collection
RFIDSec'10 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Radio frequency identification: security and privacy issues
A Survey of Symbolic Methods in Computational Analysis of Cryptographic Systems
Journal of Automated Reasoning
On the (im)possibility of perennial message recognition protocols without public-key cryptography
Proceedings of the 2011 ACM Symposium on Applied Computing
Computational soundness of indistinguishability properties without computable parsing
ISPEC'12 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Information Security Practice and Experience
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Automated tools such as model checkers and theorem provers for the analysis of security protocols typically abstract from cryptography by Dolev-Yao models, i.e., abstract term algebras replace the real cryptographic operations. Recently it was shown that in essence this approach is cryptographically sound for certain operations like signing and encryption. The strongest results show this in the sense of blackbox reactive simulatability (BRSIM)/UC with only small changes to both Dolev-Yao models and natural implementations. This notion essentially means the preservation of arbitrary security properties under active attacks in arbitrary protocol environments. We show that it is impossible to extend the strong BRSIM/UC results to usual Dolev-Yao models of hash functions in the general case. These models treat hash functions as free operators of the term algebra. This result does not depend on any restriction of the real hash function; even probabilistic hashing is covered. In contrast, we show that these models are sound in the same strict sense in the random oracle model of cryptography. For the standard model of cryptography, we also discuss several conceivable restrictions and extensions to the Dolev-Yao models and classify them into possible and impossible cases in the strong BRSIM/UC sense.