STOC '87 Proceedings of the nineteenth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
The knowledge complexity of interactive proof systems
SIAM Journal on Computing
A calculus for cryptographic protocols: the spi calculus
Proceedings of the 4th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Composition and integrity preservation of secure reactive systems
Proceedings of the 7th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
The inductive approach to verifying cryptographic protocols
Journal of Computer Security
Constraint solving for bounded-process cryptographic protocol analysis
CCS '01 Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Computer and Communications Security
Communication and Concurrency
SIAM Journal on Computing
Breaking and Fixing the Needham-Schroeder Public-Key Protocol Using FDR
TACAs '96 Proceedings of the Second International Workshop on Tools and Algorithms for Construction and Analysis of Systems
Fair Computation of General Functions in Presence of Immoral Majority
CRYPTO '90 Proceedings of the 10th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
CRYPTO '91 Proceedings of the 11th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Non-Interactive Zero-Knowledge Proof of Knowledge and Chosen Ciphertext Attack
CRYPTO '91 Proceedings of the 11th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Foundations of Secure Interactive Computing
CRYPTO '91 Proceedings of the 11th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Entity Authentication and Key Distribution
CRYPTO '93 Proceedings of the 13th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Chosen Ciphertext Attacks Against Protocols Based on the RSA Encryption Standard PKCS #1
CRYPTO '98 Proceedings of the 18th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Isabelle: The Next Seven Hundred Theorem Provers
Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Automated Deduction
A Compositional Logic for Protocol Correctness
CSFW '01 Proceedings of the 14th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Universally Composable Security: A New Paradigm for Cryptographic Protocols
FOCS '01 Proceedings of the 42nd IEEE symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Automated analysis of cryptographic protocols using Mur/spl phi/
SP '97 Proceedings of the 1997 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
A composable cryptographic library with nested operations
Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Universally Composable Signature, Certification, and Authentication
CSFW '04 Proceedings of the 17th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
A Cryptographically Sound Dolev-Yao Style Security Proof of an Electronic Payment System
CSFW '05 Proceedings of the 18th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Cryptographically Sound Theorem Proving
CSFW '06 Proceedings of the 19th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Simulation-Based Security with Inexhaustible Interactive Turing Machines
CSFW '06 Proceedings of the 19th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Reconciling Two Views of Cryptography (The Computational Soundness of Formal Encryption)
Journal of Cryptology
On the security of multi-party ping-pong protocols
SFCS '83 Proceedings of the 24th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Real-or-random Key Secrecy of the Otway-Rees Protocol via a Symbolic Security Proof
Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science (ENTCS)
Cryptographically sound security proofs for basic and public-key kerberos
ESORICS'06 Proceedings of the 11th European conference on Research in Computer Security
A cryptographically sound security proof of the Needham-Schroeder-Lowe public-key protocol
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
Computational indistinguishability logic
Proceedings of the 17th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
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A security property of a protocol is composableif it remains intact even when the protocol runs alongside other protocols in the same system. We describe a method for asserting composable security properties, and demonstrate its usefulness. In particular, we show how this method can be used to provide security analysis that is formal, relatively simple, and still does not make unjustified abstractions of the underlying cryptographic algorithms in use. It can also greatly enhance the feasibility of automatedsecurity analysis of systems of realistic size.