Communicating sequential processes
Communicating sequential processes
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What does it mean for a cryptographic protocol to be "secure"? Capturing the security requirements of cryptographic tasks in a meaningful way is a slippery business: On the one hand, we want security criteria that prevent "all potential attacks" against a protocol; on the other hand, we want our criteria not to be overly restrictive and accept "reasonable protocols". One of the main reasons for flaws is the often unexpected interactions among different protocol instances that run alongside each other in a composite system.This tutorial studies a general methodology for defining security of cryptographic protocols. The methodology, often dubbed the "trusted party paradigm", allows for defining the security requirements of a large variety of cryptographic tasks in a unified and natural way. We first review more basic formulations that capture security in isolation from other protocol instances. Next we address the security problems associated with protocol composition, and review formulations that guarantee security even in composite systems.