Semantics with applications: a formal introduction
Semantics with applications: a formal introduction
The faithfulness of abstract protocol analysis: message authentication
CCS '01 Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Computer and Communications Security
Formal Eavesdropping and Its Computational Interpretation
TACS '01 Proceedings of the 4th International Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Software
Relations Among Notions of Security for Public-Key Encryption Schemes
CRYPTO '98 Proceedings of the 18th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
A Hierarchy of Authentication Specifications
CSFW '97 Proceedings of the 10th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Universally Composable Security: A New Paradigm for Cryptographic Protocols
FOCS '01 Proceedings of the 42nd IEEE symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
A Model for Asynchronous Reactive Systems and its Application to Secure Message Transmission
SP '01 Proceedings of the 2001 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
A composable cryptographic library with nested operations
Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Secrecy types for a simulatable cryptographic library
Proceedings of the 12th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
A Computationally Sound Mechanized Prover for Security Protocols
SP '06 Proceedings of the 2006 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Computationally sound secrecy proofs by mechanized flow analysis
Proceedings of the 13th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Computationally Sound Mechanized Proofs of Correspondence Assertions
CSF '07 Proceedings of the 20th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Symposium
Theory and application of trapdoor functions
SFCS '82 Proceedings of the 23rd Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
A secure and optimally efficient multi-authority election scheme
EUROCRYPT'97 Proceedings of the 16th annual international conference on Theory and application of cryptographic techniques
Handling encryption in an analysis for secure information flow
ESOP'03 Proceedings of the 12th European conference on Programming
Adaptive security of symbolic encryption
TCC'05 Proceedings of the Second international conference on Theory of Cryptography
Computationally sound, automated proofs for security protocols
ESOP'05 Proceedings of the 14th European conference on Programming Languages and Systems
Completing the picture: soundness of formal encryption in the presence of active adversaries
ESOP'05 Proceedings of the 14th European conference on Programming Languages and Systems
Soundness of formal encryption in the presence of key-cycles
ESORICS'05 Proceedings of the 10th European conference on Research in Computer Security
Automated security proofs with sequences of games
CRYPTO'06 Proceedings of the 26th annual international conference on Advances in Cryptology
The security of triple encryption and a framework for code-based game-playing proofs
EUROCRYPT'06 Proceedings of the 24th annual international conference on The Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques
Threshold Homomorphic Encryption in the Universally Composable Cryptographic Library
ProvSec '08 Proceedings of the 2nd International Conference on Provable Security
A user interface for a game-based protocol verification tool
FAST'09 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Formal Aspects in Security and Trust
Verified Cryptographic Implementations for TLS
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC) - Special Issue on Computer and Communications Security
Security protocol verification: symbolic and computational models
POST'12 Proceedings of the First international conference on Principles of Security and Trust
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We present a computationally sound technique of static analysis for confidentiality in cryptographic protocols. The technique is a combination of the dependency flow graphs presented by Beck and Pingali and our earlier works - we start with the protocol representation as a dependency graph indicating possible flows of data in all possible runs of the protocol and replace the cryptographic operations with constructions which are "obviously secure". Transformations are made in such a way that the semantics of the resulting graph remains computationally indistinguishable from the semantics of the original graph. The transformed graphs are analysed again; the transformations are applied until no more transformations are possible. A protocol is deemed secure if its transformed version is secure; the transformed versions are amenable to a very simple security analysis. The framework is well-suited for producing fully automated (with zero user input) proofs for protocol security.