Inductive Proofs of Computational Secrecy

Authors:
Arnab Roy;Anupam Datta;Ante Derek;John C. Mitchell
Affiliations:
Stanford University, Stanford, CA, ;Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, PA, ;Stanford University, Stanford, CA, ;Stanford University, Stanford, CA,
Venue:
ESORICS '07 Proceedings of the 12th European symposium on Research In Computer Security
Year:
2007

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Abstract

Secrecy properties of network protocols assert that no probabilistic polynomial-time distinguisher can win a suitable game presented by a challenger. Because such properties are not determined by traceby- trace behavior of the protocol, we establish a trace-based protocol condition, suitable for inductive proofs, that guarantees a generic reduction from protocol attacks to attacks on underlying primitives. We use this condition to present a compositional inductive proof system for secrecy, and illustrate the system by giving a modular, formal proof of computational authentication and secrecy properties of Kerberos V5.