Notes on algebraic calculi of processes
Logics and models of concurrent systems
A calculus for cryptographic protocols
Information and Computation
A cost-based framework for analysis of denial of service in networks
Journal of Computer Security
Communication and Concurrency
A bisimulation method for cryptographic protocols
Nordic Journal of Computing
Breaking and Fixing the Needham-Schroeder Public-Key Protocol Using FDR
TACAs '96 Proceedings of the Second International Workshop on Tools and Algorithms for Construction and Analysis of Systems
Proof Techniques for Cryptographic Processes
LICS '99 Proceedings of the 14th Annual IEEE Symposium on Logic in Computer Science
CVS: A Compiler for the Analysis of Cryptographic Protocols
CSFW '99 Proceedings of the 12th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Process Algebra and Non-interference
CSFW '99 Proceedings of the 12th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
SP '96 Proceedings of the 1996 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Analysis of a Denial of Service Attack on TCP
SP '97 Proceedings of the 1997 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Analyzing Distributed Denial of Service Tools: The Shaft Case
LISA '00 Proceedings of the 14th USENIX conference on System administration
iKP: a family of secure electronic payment protocols
WOEC'95 Proceedings of the 1st conference on USENIX Workshop on Electronic Commerce - Volume 1
Design, implementation, and deployment of the iKP secure electronic payment system
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
Component-oriented verification of noninterference
Journal of Systems Architecture: the EUROMICRO Journal
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In this paper, we introduce a new security property which intends to capture the ability of a cryptographic protocol being resistant to denial of service. This property, called impassivity, is formalised in the framework of a generic value-passing process algebra, called Security Protocol Process Algebra, extended with local function calls, cryptographic primitives and special semantics features in order to cope with cryptographic protocols. Impassivity is defined as an information flow property founded on bisimulation-based non-deterministic admissible interference. A sound and complete proof method, based on equivalence-checking, for impassivity is also derived. The method extends results presented in a previous paper on admissible interference and its application to the analysis of cryptographic protocols. Our equivalence-checking method is illustrated throughout the paper on the TCP/IP connection protocol and on the 1KP secure electronic payment protocol.