Algebraic theory of processes
A calculus for cryptographic protocols
Information and Computation
Communication and Concurrency
The Theory and Practice of Concurrency
The Theory and Practice of Concurrency
Concurrent and Real Time Systems: The CSP Approach
Concurrent and Real Time Systems: The CSP Approach
Non-Interference Through Determinism
ESORICS '94 Proceedings of the Third European Symposium on Research in Computer Security
ESORICS '96 Proceedings of the 4th European Symposium on Research in Computer Security: Computer Security
A General Theory of Composition for Trace Sets Closed under Selective Interleaving Functions
SP '94 Proceedings of the 1994 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Absorbing covers and intransitive non-interference
SP '95 Proceedings of the 1995 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
A uniform type structure for secure information flow
POPL '02 Proceedings of the 29th ACM SIGPLAN-SIGACT symposium on Principles of programming languages
Information flow vs. resource access in the asynchronous pi-calculus
ACM Transactions on Programming Languages and Systems (TOPLAS)
A comparison of three authentication properties
Theoretical Computer Science - Special issue: Algebraic methodology and software technology
Message Authentication through Non Interference
AMAST '00 Proceedings of the 8th International Conference on Algebraic Methodology and Software Technology
Information Flow vs. Resource Access in the Asynchronous Pi-Calculus
ICALP '00 Proceedings of the 27th International Colloquium on Automata, Languages and Programming
Confidentiality-Preserving Refinement is Compositional - Sometimes
ESORICS '02 Proceedings of the 7th European Symposium on Research in Computer Security
Secure Information Flow for Concurrent Processes
CONCUR '00 Proceedings of the 11th International Conference on Concurrency Theory
Probabilistic Information Flow in a Process Algebra
CONCUR '01 Proceedings of the 12th International Conference on Concurrency Theory
MMM-ACNS '01 Proceedings of the International Workshop on Information Assurance in Computer Networks: Methods, Models, and Architectures for Network Security
Compositional Structuring in the B-Method: A Logical Viewpoint of the Static Context
ZB '00 Proceedings of the First International Conference of B and Z Users on Formal Specification and Development in Z and B
Information Flow Control and Applications - Bridging a Gap
FME '01 Proceedings of the International Symposium of Formal Methods Europe on Formal Methods for Increasing Software Productivity
A Uniform Approach for the Definition of Security Properties
FM '99 Proceedings of the Wold Congress on Formal Methods in the Development of Computing Systems-Volume I - Volume I
FME '01 Proceedings of the International Symposium of Formal Methods Europe on Formal Methods for Increasing Software Productivity
CSFW '02 Proceedings of the 15th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
A Generic Approach to the Security of Multi-Threaded Programs
CSFW '01 Proceedings of the 14th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Non-Interference: Who Needs It?
CSFW '01 Proceedings of the 14th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Noninterference Equations for Nondeterministic Systems
CSFW '01 Proceedings of the 14th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
A unified security framework for networked applications
Proceedings of the 2003 ACM symposium on Applied computing
Logical relation for encryption
Journal of Computer Security - Special issue on CSFW14
A unifying approach to the security of distributed and multi-threaded programs
Journal of Computer Security - Special issue on CSFW14
A process-algebraic approach for the analysis of probabilistic noninterference
Journal of Computer Security
Security policy in a declarative style
PPDP '05 Proceedings of the 7th ACM SIGPLAN international conference on Principles and practice of declarative programming
The framework of selective interleaving functions and the modular assembly kit
Proceedings of the 2005 ACM workshop on Formal methods in security engineering
Using equivalence-checking to verify robustness to denial of service
Computer Networks: The International Journal of Computer and Telecommunications Networking
Visual security protocol modeling
NSPW '05 Proceedings of the 2005 workshop on New security paradigms
A review of information security issues and respective research contributions
ACM SIGMIS Database
Localized delimited release: combining the what and where dimensions of information release
Proceedings of the 2007 workshop on Programming languages and analysis for security
Automated Synthesis of Enforcing Mechanisms for Security Properties in a Timed Setting
Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science (ENTCS)
A uniform type structure for secure information flow
ACM Transactions on Programming Languages and Systems (TOPLAS)
State-oriented Noninterference for CCS
Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science (ENTCS)
Preservation of probabilistic information flow under refinement
Information and Computation
A formalism for visual security protocol modeling
Journal of Visual Languages and Computing
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
A formal security policy for xenon
Proceedings of the 6th ACM workshop on Formal methods in security engineering
Towards Information Flow Properties for Distributed Systems
Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science (ENTCS)
Formal Aspects in Security and Trust
Petri Net Security Checker: Structural Non-interference at Work
Formal Aspects in Security and Trust
Using equivalence-checking to verify robustness to denial of service
Computer Networks: The International Journal of Computer and Telecommunications Networking
Declassification: Dimensions and principles
Journal of Computer Security - 18th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Symposium (CSF 18)
Believing the Integrity of a System
Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science (ENTCS)
Structural non-interference in elementary and trace nets
Mathematical Structures in Computer Science
Combining different proof techniques for verifying information flow security
LOPSTR'06 Proceedings of the 16th international conference on Logic-based program synthesis and transformation
A typed theory for access control and information flow control in mobile systems
ACISP'03 Proceedings of the 8th Australasian conference on Information security and privacy
Weak bisimulation for Probabilistic Timed Automata
Theoretical Computer Science
On intransitive non-interference in some models of concurrency
Foundations of security analysis and design VI
From security protocols to systems security
Proceedings of the 11th international conference on Security Protocols
A formal framework for confidentiality-preserving refinement
ESORICS'06 Proceedings of the 11th European conference on Research in Computer Security
Operational determinism and fast algorithms
CONCUR'06 Proceedings of the 17th international conference on Concurrency Theory
Limiting information leakage in event-based communication
Proceedings of the ACM SIGPLAN 6th Workshop on Programming Languages and Analysis for Security
Verifying security protocols: an application of CSP
CSP'04 Proceedings of the 2004 international conference on Communicating Sequential Processes: the First 25 Years
VECoS'11 Proceedings of the Fifth international conference on Verification and Evaluation of Computer and Communication Systems
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The information security community has long debated the exact definition of the term 'security'. Even if we focus on the more modest notion of confidentiality the precise definition remains controversial. In their seminal paper [4], Goguen and Meseguer took an important step towards a formalisation of the notion of absence of information flow with the concept of non- interference. This too was found to have problems and limitations, particularly when applied to systems displaying non-determinism which led to a proliferation of refinements of this notion and there is still no consensus as to which of these is 'correct'.We show that this central concept in information security is closely related to a central concept of computer science: that of the equivalence of systems. The notion of non-interference depends ultimately on our notion of process equivalence. However what constitutes the equivalence of two processes is itself a deep and controversial question in computer science with a number of distinct definitions proposed in the literature. We illustrate how several of the leading candidates for a definition of non-interference mirror notions of system equivalence. Casting these security concepts in a process algebraic framework clarifies the relationship between them and allows many results to be carried over regarding, for example, composition and unwinding. We also outline some generalisations of non-interference to handle partial and conditional information flows.