A General Theory of Composition for a Class of "Possibilistic" Properties
IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering
Concurrent and Real Time Systems: The CSP Approach
Concurrent and Real Time Systems: The CSP Approach
Unwinding Possibilistic Security Properties
ESORICS '00 Proceedings of the 6th European Symposium on Research in Computer Security
The Linear Time-Branching Time Spectrum (Extended Abstract)
CONCUR '90 Proceedings of the Theories of Concurrency: Unification and Extension
A Uniform Approach for the Definition of Security Properties
FM '99 Proceedings of the Wold Congress on Formal Methods in the Development of Computing Systems-Volume I - Volume I
Verification of a Formal Security Model for Multiapplicative Smart Cards
ESORICS '00 Proceedings of the 6th European Symposium on Research in Computer Security
Process Algebra and Non-interference
CSFW '99 Proceedings of the 12th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
What is Intransitive Noninterference?
CSFW '99 Proceedings of the 12th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Possibilistic Definitions of Security - An Assembly Kit
CSFW '00 Proceedings of the 13th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Absorbing covers and intransitive non-interference
SP '95 Proceedings of the 1995 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
A general theory of security properties
SP '97 Proceedings of the 1997 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Intransitive Non-Interference for Cryptographic Purposes
SP '03 Proceedings of the 2003 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
A Generic Approach to the Security of Multi-Threaded Programs
CSFW '01 Proceedings of the 14th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Noninterference Equations for Nondeterministic Systems
CSFW '01 Proceedings of the 14th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Automated information flow analysis of virtualized infrastructures
ESORICS'11 Proceedings of the 16th European conference on Research in computer security
A model transformation semantics and analysis methodology for SecureUML
MoDELS'06 Proceedings of the 9th international conference on Model Driven Engineering Languages and Systems
Formal methods for security: lightweight plug-in or new engineering discipline
FM'06 Proceedings of the 14th international conference on Formal Methods
Limiting information leakage in event-based communication
Proceedings of the ACM SIGPLAN 6th Workshop on Programming Languages and Analysis for Security
Deciding selective declassification of petri nets
POST'12 Proceedings of the First international conference on Principles of Security and Trust
Intransitive noninterference in nondeterministic systems
Proceedings of the 2012 ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Verification of distributed applications
SAFECOMP'07 Proceedings of the 26th international conference on Computer Safety, Reliability, and Security
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The development of formal security models is a difficult, time consuming, and expensive task. This development burden can be considerably reduced by using generic security models. In a security model, confidentiality as well as integrity requirements can be expressed by restrictions on the information flow. Generic models for controling information flow in distributed systems have been thoroughly investigated. Nevertheless, the known approaches cannot cope with common features of secure distributed systems like channel control, information filters, or explicit downgrading. This limitation caused a major gap which has prevented the migration of a large body of research into practice. To bridge this gap is the main goal of this article.